Cited by

d 227, 231 (Minn. 1982) .

the appellant was convicted of engaging in first-degree criminal sexual conduct toward an adult.

See, e.g., State v. Saldana , (approving expert testimony about a victim’s physical and emotion condition because it was helpful).

cmt.; -78 (Minn. 2010); d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982).

“The basic requirement of Rule 702 is the helpfulness requirement.” d 227, 229 (Minn. 1982) (quotation omitted).

In Saldana, the supreme court held that “it was reversible error for an expert to testify concerning typical post-rape symptoms and behavior of rape victims and give opinions that the complainant was a victim of rape and had not fantasized th e rape.”

(stating that opinions involving legal analysis “are deemed to be of no use to the jury”).

d 237, 239 (Minn. 1993); –03 (Minn. 1992); –32 (Minn. 1982).

(quotation and citations omitted).

When interpreting this older version of the rule, we often stated that “the basic requirement of Rule 702 is the helpfulness requirement.” MacLennan, d at 233 (); see also

operates as a blanket prohibition against the admission of expert testimony about typical rape-victim behaviors to re *284 but a defendant’s claim that the sexual conduct was consensual.

Thus, expert testimony is inadmissible if “the jury is in as good a position to reach a decision as the expert.” 232 (Minn.1982) (concluding that a counselor’s testimony that complainant was a victim of sexual assault and rape was error because the testimony was not helpful to the jury); see also Moore, d at 740

(internal quotation marks omitted); -31 , 231 n. 5 (Minn.1982) (holding that expert’s conclusion that victim was “raped” was a legal conclusion which was of no use to the jury and explaining that “opinions involving a legal analysis or mixed questions of law and fact are deemed to be of no use to the jury”).

(holding it was improper to allow doctor to testify that victim’s injury met the legal definition of great bodily harm) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); -31 , 231 n. 5 (Minn.1982) (holding that expert’s conclusion that victim was “raped” was a legal conclusion which was of no use to the jury).

(holding that it was error to admit opinion testimony by a forensic pathologist on the question of intent); -04 (Minn.1992) (holding that the district court properly excluded defendant’s proffered psychiatric testimony on the questions of intent and premeditation); -31 (Minn.1982) (holding that it was reversible error to allow opinion testimony from a sexual assault counselor on whether the victim had “typical post-rape symptoms and behavior of rape victims” and on whether the victim was telling

(an expert may not testify as to the coercive effects of an interrogation on a particular defendant because that is a jury question); -30 (Minn. 1995) (an expert may describe the nature of schizoid-personality disorder in general, but whether the defendant fit the profile was a jury question); -32 (Minn.1982) (an expert opinion about a witness’s capacity to perceive events invades the province of the jury to make credibility determinations).

he trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony concerning the behavioral characteristics typically displayed by adolescent victims of sexual assault); (holding that expert testimony about the emotional and psychological characteristics often observed in children who are victims of sexual abuse was admissible); (holding that expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome was inadmissible).

ifically assessing the defendant, because whether the defendant fit the disorder profile was a question for the jury); (holding that the trial court was within its discretion in excluding expert testimony about the effects of coercive interrogation on a particular defendant,, saying that this was a question for the jury’s determination); (stating that expert opinions concerning a witness’s capacity to perceive the world around him or her “are generally inadmissible because such opinions invade t