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Great deference to the district court’s factual determination on Batson challenges is warranted because “the record may not accurately reflect all relevant circumstances that may properly be considered.”

State v. Taylor , 6 -01 (Minn. 2002).

After all, the district court is in a “unique position” to determine whether the circumstances of the case raise an inference that the challenge was based upon race, and “the record may 5 We note that there are recent amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to objections to peremptory challenges.

(quotation omitted); (“[U]pon review of a district court’s determination under step one of the Batson process that a prima facie showing of discrimination has not been established, we will reverse only in the face of clear error.”).

State v. White (White I ), –04 (Minn. 2004); White v. State (White II), –09 (Minn. 2006).

Hunter argues that the jury should have been instructed “that they had to find [he] intended to refuse the test by his conduct.” “A defendant’s failure to propose specific jury instructions or to object to instructions before they are given to the jury generally constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal.”

(Minn. 2017) (determining that there was no inference of discrimination in part because “the State accepted one black juror”); Onyelobi, d at 348 (noting that because the defendant did not identify any other circumstance raising an inference of discrimination, it was significant that a minority venire member was selected before the state struck a person of color) ; State v. White , (concluding that defendant had not established a prima facie case in part because a minority member “ had already b

Great deference on Batson challenges is warranted because “ the record may not accurately reflect all relevant circumstances that may properly be considered.” –07 (Minn. 2004).

Pendleton , d at 724 ; see also State v. White , , 506 (Minn. 2004).

” State v. White , see also Minn. R. Crim.

When engaging in this fact-based assessment, we are “mindful of the unique positión of a district court to determine, based on all relevant factors, whether the circumstances of the case raise an inference that the challenge was based upon race.”

to determine, based on all relevant factors, whether the circumstances of the case raise an inference that the challenge was based upon race.” State v. White

But “a failure to object will not cause an appeal to fail if the [jury] instructions contain plain error affecting substantial rights or an error of fundamental law.”

A reviewing court will reverse a district court’s determination that a prima facie showing of discrimination has not been established “only in the face of clear error.”

See, (stating that appellant was found guilty of “two counts of attempted first-degree murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.05, Minn. Stat. § 609.17 (2012), and Minn. Stat. § 609.185(3)”); (stating that appellant was convicted of “attempted first-degree premeditated murder of [the victim], in violation 6 of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17, subd.

It is well-settled that mere removal of “a member of a racial minority does not necessarily establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id.; 508 (Minn. 2004).

We give deference to the district court’s Batson determination because “the record may not accurately reflect all relevant circumstances that may properly be considered.”

(“A defendant’s failure to propose specific jury instructions or to object to instructions before they are given to the jury generally constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal.”).1 In State v. Hannon, noting that the record established that the defendant was likely intoxicated on the da

We have consistently given deference to the district court’s rulings on Batson issues, realizing that the record may not accurately reflect all relevant circumstances that may properly be considered.” (citations omitted).

In fact, we have previously held that a jury instruction omitting such language was not plainly erroneous, as it “did not serve to confuse or mislead the jury and did not materially misstate the law.”

(rejecting a similar argument as in Souvannarath).

1769 (stating that steps two and three of the Batson analysis are only reached if “the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination” at step one)

But we have discretion to examine instructions that were not objected to at trial “if the instructions contain plain error affecting substantial rights or an error of fundamental law.”

Failure to object to jury instructions at trial “generally constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal.”

(citing among other authorities Minn. R.Crim.

510 n. 2 (Minn.2004) (Hanson, J., concurring) (advocating de novo standard in advance of Johnson decision).