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King asserts that the prosecutor’s 16 argument improperly vouched for the veracity of D.H.’s and K.H.’s testimony by “impliedly guaranteeing” they were truthful, that a prosecutor must not “vouch for the veracity of any particular evidence.” King, d 219, 236 (Minn. 2005), further argues that the prosecutor belittled his chosen defense, deviating from the rule that the prosecutor must not “denigrate a particular type of defense, either explicitly or in the abstract.” Vouching occurs “when the gov

35 (“It is well-settled that the state has a right to vigorously argue its case.”).

402 and 702; that is, it must be relevant, 11 helpful to the trier of fact, and given by a witness qualified as an expert.”

In making a closing argument, the State may “vigorously argue its case” by pointing out the lack of merit in a particular defense, but it “may not belittle the defense, either in the abstract or by suggesting that the defendant raised the defense because it was the only defense that may be successful.”

“When the admissibility of evidence is challenged on appeal, [appellate courts] defer to the district court’s exercise of discretion in the conduct of the trial, and [appellate courts] will not lightly overturn a district court’s evidentiary ruling.”

“When the admissibility of evidence is challenged on appeal, [appellate courts] defer to the district court’s exercise of discretion in the conduct of the trial, and [appellate courts] will not lightly overturn a district court’s evidentiary ruling.”

“When the admissibility of evidence is challenged on appeal, [appellate courts] defer to the district court ’s exercise of discretion in the conduct of the trial, and we will not lightly overturn a di strict court ’s evidentiary ruling.”

A court determines the relevance of expert testimony on domestic violence, also described as “battered-woman syndrome,” by considering “whether the proffered evidence demonstrated that the proponent had the type of relationship about which the expert will testify.” State v. Hanks , (citing State v. MacLennan , ).

“When the admissibility of evidence is challenged on appeal, we defer to the district court’s exercise of discretion in the conduct of the trial, and we will not lightly overturn a district court’s evidentiary ruling.”

“When the admissibility of evidence is challenged on appeal, [appellate courts] defer to the district court’s exercise of discretio n in the conduct of the trial, and we will not lightly overturn a district court ’s evidentiary ruling.”

“Error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” State v. MacLennan , (quotation omitted).

An error “is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict o f the jury.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

State v. MacLennan , , 230 (Minn. 2005) (citation omitted).

To establish lack of prejudice , the state must show that there is not a “reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” d 219, 236 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).

-35 (Minn. 2005) (expert testimony on battered-child syndrome admissible if it met the standard of Minn. R. Evid.

Johnson urges this court to reverse the district court’s evidentiary ruling based on Hanks, d at 666-67

“When the admissibility of 9 evidence is challenged on appeal, [appellate courts] defer to the district court’s exercise of discretion in the conduct of the trial, and [appellate courts] will not lightly overturn a district court’s evidentiary ruling.”

(“As part of the state’s right to vigorously argue its case, it may specifically argue that there is no merit to the particular defense.

(“In order to show that the [plain] error has affected his substantial rights, the defendant must show that the error was prejudicial and that it affected the outcome of the case.”).

In order to satisfy this prong, appellant must show that the error was “prejudicial” and “affected the outcome of the case.” d 219, 236 (Minn. 2005).

Because the district court did not err in admitting impeachment evidence under rule 609, we need not reach the issue of whether the error was “plain” or affected appellant’s “substantial rights.” But even if we were to reach this argument, we conclude appellant cannot show that the district court’s actions prejudiced appellant or “affected the outcome of the case,” as a review of the record demonstrates that Seigler, Harry Helps, and Kelly did not incriminate appellant with their testimony.

Further, we find that appellant cannot satisfy the “heavy burden” of demonstrating that his substantial rights were affected, as the district court did not commit an error that was “prejudicial” or “affected the outcome of the case.”

-31 (Minn. 2005) (discussing whether Frye-Mack is the correct standard applied to the admissibility of expert “syndrome” evidence).

(stating that the state “may specifically argue that there is no merit to the [defendant’s] particular defense”).