Cited by

7 that is cumulative or is corroborated by other competent evidence will be deemed harmless and will not warrant a new trial.” cf. Poppenhagen v. Sornsin Constr .

(stating an evidentiary error must be both an abuse of discretion and prejudicial to warrant reversal); (stating an evidentiary error is not prejudicial unless it might reasonably have influenced the trier of fact and changed the result of the trial).

changed the result of the [proceeding].”

changed the result of the [proceeding].”

A “district court errs if it gives a jury instruction that materially misstates the law.”

“An evidentiary error is prejudicial if it might reasonably have influenced the jury and changed the result of the trial.”

changed the result of the trial.”

changed the result of the trial.”

“But-for causation,” therefore, “is still necessary” for proximate causation in an ordinary negligence case “because if the harm would have occurred even without the negligent act, the act could not have been a [proximate cause] in bringing about the harm.”

Even if a party demonstrates that the district court erred in admitting evidence, such an error “will only compel a new trial if it results in prejudicial error to the complaining party.”

Even if a party demonstrates “[a]n improper evidentiary ruling resulting in the erroneous admission of evidence,” such an error “will only compel a new trial if it results in prejudicial error to the complaining party.”

(“If the effect of the erroneous instruction cannot be determined, we will give the complainant the benefit of the doubt by granting a new trial.”); Poppler v. Wright Hennepin Co-op Elec.

(stating that “[t]he classic test for determining factual cause is to compare what actually happened with a hypothetical situation identical to what actually happened but without the negligent act”).

(stating that evidentiary errors are prejudicial only if they could have reasonably affected the ultimate outcome).

(holding that although appellant did not artfully raise an issue in his petition for review, the issue was adequately preserved for review because it had been presented to the district court and court of appeals).

“[T]he admission of evidence that is cumulative or is corroborated by other competent evidence will be deemed harmless.” see Minn. R. Civ.

(remanding for new trial where jury found negligence but no causation and district court gave conflicting standard-of-care instructions which “analytically and practically” impacted causation analysis); Clifford v. Geritom Med., Inc., (concluding that district cour

(“If the harm would have occurred even without the negligent act, the act could not have been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”).

9 In the tort context, we have equated “direct, or proximate, cause of harm” with “substantial factor in the harm’s occurrence.” see also Christianson v. Chicago, St.

of Baker, (stating that a negligent act is a proximate “cause of harm if the act was a substantial factor in the harm’s occurrence”).

DECISION I. Motion for JMOL A district court may grant a party’s motion for JMOL when , in light of all the evidence, a verdict is “perverse and palpably contrary to the evidence.”

See George v. Estate of Baker , (“[I]f the harm would have occurred even without the negligent act, the act could not have been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432 (1965)).

George v. Estate of Baker

In addition, appellant must demonstrate that the error “changed the result of the trial.” George v. Estate of Baker , (“An evidentiary error is prejudicial if it might reasonably have influenced the jury and changed the result of the trial.”); see also Kedrowski, d at 62; City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Co- op.

“An evidentiary error is prejudicial if it might reasonably have influenced the jury and changed the result of the trial.”

(explaining that a jury instruction is prejudicial if the erroneous instruction could have influenced the jury’s analysis).

Generally, “where a jury has found negligence without causation,” appellate courts are reluctant “to second -guess the verdict.” George v. Estate of Baker

P. 61; Crandall, d at 349 .

“An evidentiary error is prejudicial if it might reasonably have influenced the jury and changed the result of the trial.” 1 Drug-Related Evidence Evidence that Moeller may have been intoxicated at the time of the crash and other drug-related evidence was admitted at trial over appellant’s objection .

Erroneously excluding evidence will result in a new trial “if it might reasonably have influenced the jury and changed the result of the trial.”

A jury instruction is erroneous if it “materially misstates the law.”

George v. Estate of Baker