Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Viker v. Wal-Mart, 695 N.W.2d 97.

109 citing documents.

State v. Osorio 891 N.W.2d 620 Minn. 2017
VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Renard Rucker Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Yachin Kadimel Scott Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Quentin Todd Chute 887 N.W.2d 834 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Tommy William Mix Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Steven Kobena Ampah Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Ashley Ann Johnson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Reversal is appropriate, however, “if facts proving an essential element 6 of the offense are left more to conjecture and speculation than to reasonable inference.”
State of Minnesota v. Romere Jerome Powell Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” (quotation omitted).
In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. G., Child. Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Reversal is appropriate, however, “if facts proving an essential element of the offense are left more to conjecture and speculation than to reasonable inference.”
State of Minnesota v. Patricia Ann Shepard Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Ernest Alvin Ranzy Minn. Ct. App. 2016
However, “[w]hen the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.” d 97, 109 (Minn. 2005).
State of Minnesota v. Blake Adam Schneider Minn. Ct. App. 2016
“While prosecutors do have the right to legitimately argue, analyze, explain evidence and present proper inferences, they may not directly or indirectly comment on a defendant’s failure to testify.” -07 (Minn. 2005) (citations omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Cornelius Kinte Payton Minn. Ct. App. 2016
DECISION Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the [fact-finder] to reach the verdict which [it] did.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Chevaze Darrell Ward Minn. Ct. App. 2016
DECISION Sufficiency of the Evidence Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” (quotation omitted).
Tracy Alan Zornes v. State of Minnesota 880 N.W.2d 363 Minn. 2016
ctor.” 6 Indirect references to a defendant’s choice not to testify constitute misconduct if they “(1) manifest the prosecutor’s intention to call attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, or (2) are such that the jury would naturally have understood them as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.” ().
State of Minnesota v. Jeremiah James Shefelbine Minn. Ct. App. 2016
24, 2011); (stating that “[w]hen the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation” and determining that “delay in bringing the matter to trial was occasioned by defense motions for a change of venue, continuances, and a Rule 20 evaluat
State of Minnesota v. Jeremy Williams Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Erik Demetrius White, Sr. Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Trevon Fuller Minn. Ct. App. 2016
24, 2011); (stating that “[w]hen the overall 5 delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation,” and determining that “delay in bringing the matter to trial was occasioned by defense motions for a c
State of Minnesota v. Mark Anthony Sanders Minn. Ct. App. 2016
lant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that he possessed cocaine.1 Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. James Pierre Dortch Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Conversely, “[w]hen the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.”
State of Minnesota v. Arne Henry Mahlberg Minn. Ct. App. 2016
or the basis of the ruling is obvious.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Sonny Ray Juday Minn. Ct. App. 2016
But reversal is appropriate “if facts proving an essential element of the offense are left more to conjecture and speculation than to reasonable inference.”
State of Minnesota v. Troy Adam Gocha Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Reversal is appropriate, however, “if facts proving an essential element of the offense are left more to conjecture and speculation than to reasonable inference.” d 97, 108 (Minn. 2005).
State of Minnesota v. Marlow Shelton McDonald Minn. Ct. App. 2016
24, 2011); (stating that “[w]hen the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation” and determining that “delay in bringing the matter to trial was occasioned by defense motions for a change of venue, continuances, and a Rule 20 evaluat
State of Minnesota v. Jeremy Bruce Cournoyer Minn. Ct. App. 2016
or the basis of the ruling is obvious.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Keith Terrell Bland Minn. Ct. App. 2015
VI; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6
State of Minnesota v. SerShawn Copone Nicholson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Reversal is appropriate, however, “if facts proving an essential element of the offense are left more to conjecture and speculation than to reasonable inference.”
State of Minnesota v. Momat Ali Jagne Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.”
State of Minnesota v. Edward Valentine Forsythe Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Our review of a sufficiency-of-the- evidence challenge is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was 5 sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Kemen Lavatos Taylor, II 869 N.W.2d 1 Minn. 2015
“When the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.”
State of Minnesota v. Charles Kihanya Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Cindarion De'Angelo Butler Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Indirect references to a defendant’s failure to testify are prohibited if they either “(1) manifest the prosecutor’s intention to call attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, or (2) are such that the jury would naturally have understood them as a comment on defendant’s failure to testify.”
State of Minnesota v. Roxanne Kay DeFlorin Minn. Ct. App. 2015
VI; Minn. Const. art. I., § 6
State of Minnesota v. Albert Michael Openshaw Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Joseph Nickolas Mousel Minn. Ct. App. 2015
are left more to conjecture and speculation than to reasonable inference.”
State of Minnesota v. Dayna Kristine Bell Minn. Ct. App. 2014
(providing that indirect references to a defendant’s failure to testify are prohibited if they manifest a prosecutor’s intent to call attention to the defendant’s failure to testify or if they are such that a jury would naturally understand them as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify)
State of Minnesota v. Claude Riley Crockson, Jr. 854 N.W.2d 244 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
In the Matter of the Application of Arthur Senty-Haugen for a Name Change. Minn. Ct. App. 2014
(concluding that hearsay statements that corroborated other testimony were harmless).
Stephanie Ann Keim v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2014
To be admissible under the state-of-mind exception, “[t]he statement must be contemporaneous with the mental state sought to be proven,” there must be “no suspicious circumstances suggesting a motive for the declarant to fabricate or misrepresent his or her thoughts,” and the declarant’s state of mind “must be relevant to an issue in the case.” -05 (Minn. 2005).
State of Minnesota v. Donald William Carlson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Generally, “[b]y rule in Minnesota, trial is to commence within 60 days from the date of the demand.” d 97, 108–09 (Minn. 2005); accord Minn. R. Crim.
State of Minnesota v. Keith Richard Rossberg 851 N.W.2d 609 Minn. 2014
In the absence of such a defense, however, “[o]rdinarily, a homicide victim’s state of mind is not relevant to whether the defendant committed the crime.”
State v. Carlson 845 N.W.2d 827 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992); (stating that the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution).
Hooper v. State 838 N.W.2d 775 Minn. 2013
Because the substance of T.E.’s putative testimony was introduced at Hooper’s trial and the record shows that T.E.’s live testimony would not have changed the result in light of all of the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that there is no “ ‘reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct.
State v. Castillo-Alvarez 820 N.W.2d 601 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
“Generally, hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless it comes within a recognized exception.” (citing Minn. R. Evid.
State v. Johnson 811 N.W.2d 136 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
VI; Minn. Const. art I, § 6
State v. Prtine 799 N.W.2d 594 Minn. 2011
State v. Vue 797 N.W.2d 5 Minn. 2011
Indirect statements made by prosecutors referring to a defendant’s failure to testify are “prohibited if they either (1) manifest the prosecutor’s intention to call attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, or (2) are such that the jury would naturally have understood them as a comment on defendant’s failure to testify.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
State v. Ahmed 782 N.W.2d 253 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
or the basis of the ruling is obvious.” (quotation omitted).