Cited by

Quoting State v. Barnes , the State conceded that the mental state “for depraved mind is equivalent” to the mental state “for recklessness.”2 Nevertheless, it claimed that Cole man was arguing that a defendant must know that his reckless act would cause death.

at 143 (citation omitte d) (internal quotation marks omitted); (stating that “substantial deference is given to the legislature where an underinclusiveness challenge is made on rational basis review”).

State v. Barnes , d 325, 335 (Minn. 2006) (citing Black v. State , n.1 ( Minn. 1997)).7 Likewise, Reek’s claims regarding his counsel’s alleged failure to effectively cross- examine some witnesses relies on facts not found in the record.

Without additional facts, “any conclusions reached by [an appellate] court as to whether [a defendant’s] attorney’s assistance was deficient would be pure speculation.” Id.; n.4 (Minn. 2008); Jackson, d at 463

d 325, 337 (Minn. 2006).

Third-degree murder “cannot occur where the defendant’s actions were focused on a specific person.”

n.4 (Minn. 2006) (explaining that the court was not required to consider the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the domestic abuse murder statute because he failed to challenge the constitutionality of the statute in the district court); (explaining that we “ge

See, (ruling no error occurred where disclosure of defendant’s past drug use was inadvertent and “[m]ore importantly, events that occurred later in trial eliminated any prejudice”); (declining to grant mistrial absent a showing that there was a reasonable

Without those additional facts, “any conclusions reached by [an appellate] court as to whether [a defendant’s] attorney’s assistance was deficient would be pure speculation.” Id.; n.4 (Minn. 2008); Jackson, d at 463

See id.; -32 (Minn.2006) (rejecting equal-protection challenge to difference in punishment for first-degree domestic-abuse murder and third-degree depraved-mind murder because the two statutes “do not punish identical conduct” based on difference in elements of the offenses).

(holding that a hypothetical “blow-by-blow” account of an un-witnessed fight in the prosecutor’s closing argument, using qualified language and based on evidence, was not prosecutorial misconduct).

(explaining that the “state’s closing argument can include reasonable inferences from the evidence” and that doing so does not amount to prosecu-torial misconduct).

-32 (Minn.2006) (finding domestic-abuse murder and depraved-mind murder statutes do not irreconcilably conflict in part because even if all domestic-abuse incidents could be considered eminently dangerous, a depraved-murder element, not all eminently dangerous acts constitute domestic abuse); Williams, d