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But “[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that ‘an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000)); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884–85 (1968).

3 A law-enforcement officer may, however, “‘consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop’” of a motor vehicle if “‘the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968))).

While the reasonable- suspicion standard is not high, it cannot be based on a mere “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” (quotation omitted).

5 A law-enforcement officer may, however, “‘consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop’” of a motor vehicle if “‘the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968))).

A law enforcement officer may, “‘consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop’” if “‘the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000)).

But we evaluate the dog sniff under the reasonable-suspicion standard, which is “less demanding than probable cause.”

d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008).

An investigatory stop is valid where the police officer has a “reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation omitted).

A law enforcement officer may, however, “consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop” of a motor vehicle if “the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)).

The Stop An officer may “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation omitted) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)).

The 11 reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause,” but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.”

“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high” and “less demanding than probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence.” (quotations omitted).

Reasonable, ar-ticulable suspicion exists “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” see also *611 (stating that the reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but that the suspicion must be based on more than a mere hunch of criminal activity).

While the reasonable suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence,” it still “ ‘requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.’ ” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S.Ct.

in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the stop of an automobile because an informant had tipped them that a person traveling in the automobile possessed a firearm.

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high.” (internal quotation marks omitted).

the State argued that a peace officer is not required to determine proactively that a person does not have a permit because the failure to obtain a permit to carry is not an element of the gross misdemeanor defined by Minn.Stat.