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Under this exception, a police officer may briefly detain an individual when the officer “has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation omitted).

N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (explaining that reasonable-suspicion standard “is less demanding than probable cause”).

(quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high” but it requires police “to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted); see also Diede, d at 843 (“A hunch, without additional objectively articulable facts, cannot provide the basis for an investigatory stop.” (quotation omitted)).

Under this exception, a police officer may briefly detain an individual when the officer “has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation omitted).

“The reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” (quotations omitted).

(stating that the reasonable suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause”).

The reasonable- suspicion standard is “not high,” but does require more than a “hunch of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted).

Although the reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence,” it still “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)); (explaining that reasonable suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch” (quotations omitted)).

The reasonable suspicion standard is “not high,” but it requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” (quotations omitted).

The reasonable- 6 suspicion standard is “not high,” but requires more than a mere “hunch of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted).

1 (2022), which states that a temporary permit must be displayed “where a license plate would normally be affixed, and plainly visible.” The right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures is subject to an exception for an officer to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation omitted).

We have also often remarked that the threshold for reasonable suspicion “is ‘not high.’ ” d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011) ().

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)

1a (2024); -95 (Minn. 2008) (holding that police officers have reasonable suspicion to stop a person if a reliable informant has alleged that the person has a firearm).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high.” (quotations omitted).

And while the reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding” than the probable-cause standard, it still “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)).

Here, the state agreed that “a trial will be unnecessary if the defendant prevails on appeal.” 6 (quotation omitted).

The “reasonable suspicion” standard is “not high.” ().

Reasonable suspicion requires “at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 5 28 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)).

The standard for demonstrating reasonable, articulable suspicion is “not high,” but officers “must articulate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).

Although “the reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” it requires “more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch of criminal activity.” d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high,” but does require more than a “hunch of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted).

To satisfy the reasonable-suspicion standard, the officer “must articulate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

An officer may, however, “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).

The reasonable suspicion showing is “not high,” (quotation omitted), but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch,” (quotation omitted).