Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390.

310 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Robert Carl Thoensen Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Police must only show that the stop was based on more than “an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Marco Allen Coney Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(quotations and citation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Stuart Donald Luhm 880 N.W.2d 606 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Stuart Donald Luhm 880 N.W.2d 606 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
informant was “not reliable and provided no credible basis of knowledge to support his [or] her assertion that [Luhm and Steinmetz] traffic marijuana.” The reasonable-siispicion standard may be *621 “met based on information provided by a reliable informant” if the information provided bears “indicia of reliability that make the alleged criminal conduct sufficiently likely.” -94 (Minn.2008).
Shannon Forstrom Walsh v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Shannon Forstrom Walsh v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
The reasonable- suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” (quotation omitted).
Christine Marie Tomlinson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, (A15-1424), and State of Minnesota, (A15-1431) v. Christine Marie Tomlinson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Christine Marie Tomlinson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, (A15-1424), and State of Minnesota, (A15-1431) v. Christine Marie Tomlinson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)
State of Minnesota v. Tyler Thomas Devries Morse 878 N.W.2d 499 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Tyler Thomas Devries Morse 878 N.W.2d 499 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Jayson Stanley Sam Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. James Lamar Davis Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. James Lamar Davis Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Jayson Stanley Sam Minn. Ct. App. 2016
The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion required must be based on more than a mere “hunch.” (quotations omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Ann Marie Hoyer Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Jarrod Dwayne Miller v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Jesse Andrew Faust Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Jarrod Dwayne Miller v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(stating that the standard for reasonable suspicion is not high, but requires more than an 8 inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or hunch).
State of Minnesota v. Jesse Andrew Faust Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Ann Marie Hoyer Minn. Ct. App. 2016
But a law-enforcement officer may, “‘consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop’” of a motor vehicle if “‘the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968))).
State of Minnesota v. Sherman Peak Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Sherman Peak Minn. Ct. App. 2016
The reasonable-suspicion standard is 8 not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Jose Martin Lugo, Jr. Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Justin Glenn Joecks Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Justin Glenn Joecks Minn. Ct. App. 2016
“An investigatory stop of a vehicle is justified if police have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted); (stating that a traffic stop must be supported by “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot”) (quotation omitted)).
State of Minnesota v. Jose Martin Lugo, Jr. Minn. Ct. App. 2016
But it “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Anthony Alan Early Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Anthony Alan Early Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Aamir Karmoeddien Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Aamir Karmoeddien Minn. Ct. App. 2015
However, “an officer may, “consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop” of a motor vehicle provided that “the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884–85 (1968))).
Benjamin David Telschow v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Benjamin David Telschow v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)).
State of Minnesota v. Curtis Leroy Johnson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Curtis Leroy Johnson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
But a law enforcement officer may, “‘consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 4 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968))).
State of Minnesota v. Patrick Lamar Mobley Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Patrick Lamar Mobley Minn. Ct. App. 2015
The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high but requires something more than a mere “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” (quotations omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Elliott Patrick Ketz Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Bryan Anthony Hartshorn Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Elliott Patrick Ketz Minn. Ct. App. 2015
A law-enforcement officer may, however, “consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop” of a motor vehicle if “the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 6 (1968))).
State of Minnesota v. Bryan Anthony Hartshorn Minn. Ct. App. 2015
A police officer may stop a motor vehicle to investigate “when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Bryan Anthony Case Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Bryan Anthony Case Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Maurice Antwan Hegwood Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Maurice Antwan Hegwood Minn. Ct. App. 2015
A law-enforcement officer may, “‘consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop’” of a motor vehicle if “‘the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968))).
Justin Steven Luedke v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Justin Steven Luedke v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Melissa Jill Thompson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Melissa Jill Thompson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“The United States Supreme Court has held that ‘an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, 4 articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000)).
Lester Leroy Hiltz, Jr. v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Lester Leroy Hiltz, Jr. v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Police must only show that the stop was based on more than “an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” (quotation omitted).