Cited by

–31 (Minn. App. 2007) (collecting cases).

But a waiver of the right to counsel may still be valid “if the circumstances demonstrate that the defendant has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.”

(recognizing that, in previous cases affirming waiver of counsel despite the district court’s failure to conduct on-the-record colloquy on the decision, the defendants had “either extensive contact with defense attorneys or stand-by counsel or both”).

Moreover, “[w]hen a defendant has consulted with an attorney prior to waiver, a trial court could ‘reasonably presume that the benefits of legal assistance and the risks of proceeding without it had been described to defendant in detail by counsel.’” Worthy, d at 276 (); (observing that Minnesota’s appellate courts have upheld waivers of counsel despite inadequate on-the-record inquires when defendants have had “either extensive contact with defense attorneys or stand-by counsel or both”).

8 (recognizing that, in previous cases affirming waiver of counsel despite the district court’s failure to conduct on- the-record colloquy on the decision, the defendants had “either extensive contact with defense attorneys or stand-by counsel or both”).

But a waiver of the right to counsel may still be constitutionally valid even if the waiver is not in writing “if the circumstances demonstrate that the defendant has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.” State v. Haggins , see State v. Garibaldi

Finally, although appellant never had independent counsel advise him regarding waiver, (considering appellant’s opportunity to discuss waiver with independent counsel in determining validity of waiver), the prosecutor twice discussed self-representation with appellant.

Worthy, d at 276; d 823, 828 (Minn. App. 2007).

See State v. Garibaldi , (recognizing that in previous cases affirming waiver of counsel despite the district court’s failure to conduct on -the-record colloquy on the decision, the defendants had “either extensive contact with defense attorneys or stand-by counsel or both”).

(recognizing that in previous cases affirming waiver of counsel despite district court’s failure to conduct on-the-record colloquy on the decision, th e defendants had “either exte nsive contact with defense attorneys or stand-by counsel or both”).

1(4); see also State v. Jones , (stating that appointment of standby counsel is discretionary); State v. Garibaldi , (suggesting that the consequences of a district court’s failure to adhere to waiver of counsel rules may be mitigated by the appointment of an advisory counsel).

(stating that “a denial of the right to counsel does not require a showing of prejudice to obtain reversal.”).

In arguing for a contrary conclusion, Alexander relies heavily on this court’s

Garibaldi, -31 (Minn. App. 2007).

d 823 (Minn. App. 2007).

This court reviews a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel to determine whether the “record supports a determination that [the defendant] knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.”