Cited by

3 Although district courts typically should not issue cautionary instructions sua sponte, it may have been beneficial for the district court to explain that it sustained Godbout’s objection and to inform the jury that the prosecutor’s comments were inappropriate.

The supreme court has stated that district courts are hesitant to give a cautionary instruction sua sponte “because [it] may draw additional attention to potentially prejudicial issues” and because “a defendant may choose not to request an instruction for strategic reasons.” -43 (Minn. 2006) (holding that it is not ordinarily plain error for district court to fail to give cautionary instruction sua sponte).

In other words, a district court’s erroneous exclusion of alternative-perpetrator evidence “is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict is surely unattributable to that error.” (“Under this standard, we must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same

(reasoning that the exclusion of alternative-perpetrator evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because “the evidence incriminating [the defendant] was strong.”).

-42 (Minn. 2006) (concluding that the district court did not err by admitting evidence of threats against four witnesses and evidence that one witness quit their job out of fear as a result of testifying despite the defendant’s argument that the evidence should have been excluded because there was no evidence

And a defendant may present evidence that an alternative perpetrator committed a crime if the identity of the perpetrator is at issue and the evidence “has an inherent tendency to connect the alternative party with the commission of the crime.”

(stating that it was unnecessary to decide whether the district court erred in excluding defense evidence becaus e the alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

that he was involved in [the victim’s] murder.”

See State v. Vance , , 443 (Minn. 2006) ("[C]ourts are hesitant to sua sponte give an instruction because an instruction may draw additional attention to potentially prejudicial issues.").

The defendant bears the burden of “establishing that the [district] court abused its discretion and that the error was prejudicial.”

use of prior bad acts , relationship, or impeachment evidence, the supreme court has previously recognized that district courts are justifiably hesitant in giving cautionary instructions sua sponte because “an instruction may draw additional attention to potentially prejudicial issues” and be cause “a defendant may choose not to request an instruction for strategic reasons.” -43 (Minn. 2006) (holding that it is not ordinarily plain error for the district court to fail to give a cautionary instru

(holding that threat evidence was admissible to bolster credibility of witnesses who were impeached based on cooperation with state).

at 53 (-43 (Minn.2006)).

State v. Vance (Vance I), -33 (Minn. 2006).

But here, where we determined that the defendant had not met his foundational showing, Nissalke did not provide any evidence that actually tied either B.F.

We have recognized that “[ajlternative-perpetrator evidence is admissible if it has an inher *34 ent tendency to connect the alternative party with the commission of the crime.”

-42 (Minn.2006); Clifton, d at 797-98 .