Cited by

Commitment of Giem, (alteration in original) (quoting Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3).

n.6 (Minn. 2007); see Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413–14 (2004).

18, 2007); n.6 (Minn. 2007) (noting that “classifying time prescriptions, even rigid ones, under the heading subject matter jurisdiction can be confounding” and that “[t]he label jurisdictional should be used only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal

Commitment of Giem, n.6 (Minn. 2007).

But “[o]ur state constitution provides a broad grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the district court, providing that ‘[t]he district court has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases.’” (quoting Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3).

Commitment of Giem, (quotation omitted).

Commitment of Giem, (“In the absence of a clear legislative statement that the [statutory] deadlines operate to divest the court of jurisdiction .

d 422, 426-30 (Minn. 2007) (citing Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd.

Commitment of Giem, -29 (Minn. 2007) (distinguishing failure to comply with statutory procedures from lack of subject -matter jurisdiction).

Commitment of Giem, -28 (Minn. 2007) (concluding statutory procedural provisions were “mandatory” where they specified a consequence for the failure to hold a civil-commitment hearing within the statutory time frame).

See Briles v. 2013 GMC Terrain, (statutory interpretation); In re Civil Commitment of Giem , -26 (Minn. 2007) (subject -matter jurisdiction).

“[I]f we can construe a statute to avoid a constitutional confrontation, we are to do so.” In re 18 Civil Commitment of Giem, , 429 (Minn. 2007).

“Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.” See In re Civil Commitment of Giem , -26 (Minn. 2007).

Procedural requirements in a statute, “even if written in mandatory language,” do not necessarily “operate to divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction when such statutory provisions are not satisfied.” 428-29 (Minn. 2007) (holding that although the timing provisions in Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd.

See, e.g. , In re Civil Commitment of Giem , , 426-430 (Minn. 2007) (addressing jurisdictional consequences of district court's failure to hold hearing within time provided for by statute).

states that it applies, “except where the license is revoked or disqualified under section 169A.52.” 3 Recently, the supreme court has clarified that there is “a critical difference between a rule governing subject -matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim -processing rule.” (quotation omitted); (“[T]here is a fundamental difference between finding that a deadline is mandatory and concluding that it operates to take away the district court’s authority to act.”); (stating that timeliness requi

4(a) is not jurisdictional); In re Civil Commitment of Giem , –28 (Minn. 2007) (discussing cases and concluding that not all time limits are jurisdictional); Ruby v. Vannett , –22 (Minn. 2006) (holding that deadlines for filing and hearing motion for a new trial or for amended findings under Minn. R. Civ.

(citing Robinette v. Price, 214 Minn. 521, 526, .

rified that cases “ that discuss the mandatory/directory distinction in the context of questions of statutor y interpretation do not provide an answer to the question of whether those statutory provisions, even if written in mandatory language, operate to divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction when such statutory provisions are not satisfied.” (stating that timeliness requirements are “procedural tools” that do not divest a district court of jurisdiction and inte rpreting Minn.

And, waiver must arise from “voluntary choice” and “not mere negligence.” City of Minneapolis v. Minne apolis Police Relief Ass’n , d 165, 178 (Minn. Ap p. 2011) (quoting In re Commitment of Giem , ).

(reasoning that “there is a fundamental difference between finding that a deadline is mandatory and concluding that it operates to take away the district court’s authority to act”); (holding that “60-day time limit for hearing new trial [or] amended

The Minnesota Supreme Court has discouraged the inexact use of the term “jurisdiction.” See, e.g., McCullough & Sons, 590 & n.3 (Minn. 2016) (“Jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear and decide disputes.” (internal quotations omitted)); & n.6 (Minn. 2007) (distinguishing between “non-jurisdictional procedural rules” and subject-matter jurisdiction, which relates to the district court’s adjudicatory authority).

n.6 (Minn. 2007); see also Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 64 (1970) (explaining that “procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction 5 of its business are not jurisdictional and can be relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discret

at 422; (noting that Rubey “discussed the difference between deadlines as procedural tools and deadlines operating as jurisdictional limits”).

More recently, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is ‘a critical difference between a rule governing subject-matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim-processing rule.’” (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456, 124 S. Ct. 906, 916 (2004)); (“[T]here is a fundamental difference between finding that a deadline is mandatory and concluding that it operates to take away the district court’s authority to act.”).

Recent opinions of our court and the Minnesota Supreme Court have both noted and cautioned against the misuse of the term “jurisdiction.” See, n.6 (Minn. 2007); McCullough & Sons, n.1 (Minn. App. 2015), review granted (Minn. Oct.

Carlson v. Doran, 252 Minn. 449, 456

It is black-letter law that “if we can construe a statute to avoid a constitutional confrontation, we are to do so.”

Notwithstanding our efforts in recent years to distinguish procedural tools from jurisdictional limits, see, -29 (Minn. 2007), there is a need for further clarification of our jurisprudence on subject matter jurisdiction.