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5 “[P]ossibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Stein , (quotation omitted).

State v. Stein , , 719 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

We defer to the fact-finder’s “acceptan ce of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that c onflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.”

(stating that “although the defendant’s version of the events, if believed might give rise to different inferences, the jury w as free to, and evidently did, reject defe ndant’s version of these events” (quotation omitted)).

that she does not remember that she consented, and that she fell asleep after having sex.” “[P]ossibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Stein , (quotation omitted).

The state argues that appellant’s position that he may not have known the items were in the car is not enough to overturn his conviction because this court “will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” (quotation omitted).

However, (plurality opinion)

(quotations and citation omitted).

Further, in order to reverse a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must consider “whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved support a rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Silvernail, d at 599.

Circumstances Proved “[W]hen reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, ‘our first task is to identify the circumstances proved.’” ( (plurality opinion)).

We do not overturn verdicts based on “mere conjecture.”

And we decide whether the circumstances proved are “consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.” –15 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

It is not this court’s role to interpret the evidence, because the jury is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and has already done so.

It is not this court’s role to interpret the evidence, because the jury is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and has already done so.

See, (“Although we eventually abandoned the special jury instruction, we retained the traditional rational hypothesis review standard.”) (Meyer, J., concurring); n.4 (Minn. 1994) (holding that Turnipseed control

(“[W]e will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.”) (quotation omitted).

d 709, 714 (Minn. 2010).

Silvernail, d at 598-99; Al-Naseer, d at 473-74; (Meyer, J., concurring) (citing 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.6(c) (3d ed. 2007)) (other citations omitted) (“The trial court on a motion for judgment of acquittal, and the appellate court in reviewing the claim on appeal, apply the same basic standard of review.”).

(permitting the district court to make “legitimate inferences” from the record facts).

“In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.” (quotation omitted).

In identifying the circumstances proved, we defer “ ‘to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.’ ” Andersen, d at 329 ( (plurality opinion)).