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This clause provides criminal defendants the right of cross-examination, which is “the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” (quotation omitted).

“Effective cross-examination is essential to a fair trial because ‘[c]ross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of [their] testimony are tested.’” (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)).

A defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause are “not violated by limitations on cross-examination so long as the jury is presented with sufficient information from which to appropriately draw inferences as to the witness’s reliability.”

For this reason, “[t]he showing required for a petitioner to receive an evidentiary hearing is lower than that required to receive a new trial.” d 651, 659 (Minn. 2007); (“The burden of proof for a postconviction evidentiary hearing is lower than the burden for new trial.”).

The right to confront witnesses “is not violated by limitations on cross -examination so long as the jury is presented with sufficient information from which to appropriately draw inferences as to the witness’s reliability.”

Lanz- Terry, see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (noting that district courts have “wide latitude” to reasonably limit cross- examination “based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant”); (noting that cross-examination may be limited “so long as the jury is presented with sufficient information from which to appropriately draw inferences as to

a choice” as to future custody), and cross-examination is an important tool in testing credibility, see, e.g. , State v. Ferguson , (explaining purposes of cross -examination, including testing credibility).

y were false, and misspelled the name of the witness who was allegedly recanting); Vance v. State , , 514-15 (Minn. 2008) (concluding that the affidavits of two witnesses recanting their trial testimony lacked sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to merit an evidentiary hearing because the reasons given for falsely testifying were vague and did not make sense); State v. Ferguson , , 659-60 (Minn. 2007) (concluding that an unsigned memorandum written by a defense investigator who interviewed the

(citing State v. Ferguson , , 659-60 (Minn. 2007) ) ).

Since post- trial recant ations raise suspicions even when they are embodied in sworn affidavits and testimony, –60 (Minn. 2007), we are satisfied that the district court rightly chose not to administer an evidentiary hearing based on Hernandez’s offering of Soto’s letter.

“Courts generally view recanting affidavits and testimony with suspicion.”

When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we conduct “ ‘a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.’” ().

“Courts generally view recanting affidavits and testimony with suspicion.”

State v. Ferguson (Ferguson I), (applying the indicia-of-trustworthiness standard from witness-recantation claims to claims involving newly discovered evidence).

Compare Ferguson, d at 813 (articulating the six factors to evaluate the trustworthiness of a statement against penal interest, all of which focus on the reliability of the declarant and the declarant’s statements), (concluding that an unnotarized affidavit of an investigator reporting a witness’s recantation did not have sufficient indicia of trustworthiness under the Larrison test to warrant *155 an evidentiary hearing).

State v. Ferguson (Ferguson I)

State v. Ferguson (Ferguson I), Vance v. State (Vance II)

Specifically, in State v. Ferguson, we said that “to justify the expense and risk of transporting the petitioner to an evidentiary hearing, it seems to us that the petitioner has an obligation to make a greater showing of a genuine recantation.”

See Opsahl, d at 424 (concluding that sworn statements alleging the State pressured witnesses to give misleading testimony were more than “mere ‘argumentative assertions’ ”); (dismissing without prejudice a petition for postconviction relief because the petitioner submitted only an unsigned memorandum by a third party in support of his allegation that a witness recanted).

See State v. Ferguson (Jermaine I)

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we conduct “a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

State v. Ferguson (Ferguson I)

ANALYSIS “On review of postconviction decisions, [appellate courts] extend a broad review of both questions of law and fact.”