Cited by

19 In closing arguments, a prosecutor cannot make “arguments that divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence[] by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making predictions of the consequences of the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

Moreover, the district court found that these arguments were proper, “and this conclusion 8 is entitled to deference.”

“A prosecutor is not permitted to appeal to the passions of the jury during closing argument.” -62 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

to refer to everybody who was in court when the evidence was presented.”

in which the supreme court explained that using the word “we” does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct per se and that the word does not necessarily align the prosecutor with jurors if the word could reasonably be interpreted to “refer to everybody who was in court when the evidence was presented.

(concluding that the district court did not err by determining that the prosecutor’s statement that the complainants were “victims of a brutal crime” and “[t]heir lives deserve the protection of the law” in part because the statement was isolated and constituted only three lines of a 37-page closing ar

in which the supreme court held that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct because the word “we” “does not necessarily exclude the defendant .

(finding that prosecutor’s use of “we” was not misconduct because the prosecutor was presenting all proper inferences that could be drawn from the evidence).

However, “we” statements are permissible when they are used to reiterate the evidence and do not “necessarily exclude the defendant.”

In response, in which the supreme court concluded that a prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by using the word “we” when summarizing the evidence that had been presented at trial.

Counsel is not obligated “to include all possible claims on direct appeal, but rather is permitted to argue only the most meritorious claims.” (quotation omitted).

P. 6.01 or lack of probable cause.4 Counsel is not obligated “to include all possible claims on direct appeal, but rather is permitted to argue only the most meritorious claims.” (quotation omitted).

f-counsel claim that is based on trial strategy,” which includes deciding which defenses to raise and “the extent of counsel’s investigation and the selection of evidence”); (instructing that “[c]ounsel does not act unreaso nably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail”); Nunn v. State , (directing that similar deference is given to appellate counsel strategy).

Counsel is not obligated “to include all possible claims on direct appeal, but rather [is] permitted to argue only the most meritorious claims.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

“Prosecutorial misconduct results from violations of clear or established standards of conduct, e.g., rules, 9 laws, orders by a district court, or clear commands in this state’s case law.” (quotation omitted).

(quoting Mayhorn, d at 790).

Nunn v. State , State v. Mayhorn , 72

N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. App. 2000) (stating that it is misconduct for a prosecutor to “make statements urging the jury to protect society or to send a message with its verdict”), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2000) ; State v. Thompson , d 734, 742 (Minn. 1998) (stating that arguments inviting the jur ors to put themselves in the victim’s shoes are generally improper); (stating that it is misconduct for a prosecutor to use the term “we” to desc ribe the prosecutor and jury as members of a group tha

“A prosecutor is not permitted to appeal to the passions of the jury during closing argument.” Nunn v. State , -62 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

The re strictions Grazzini-Rucki cites, however, “do not preclude all arguments relating to the impact of the crime on the victim.” d 657, 662 (Minn. 2008).

Nunn v. State , (finding prosecutor’s use of “we” could “reasonably be interpreted .

to refer to everybody who was in court when the evidence was presented.”

presented at trial (i.e., ‘we learned’ various facts from the trial testimony).”

A prosecutor should not “divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence[] by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused.” (quotation omitted).

“The determination of the propriety of a prosecutor’s closing argument is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.” (quotations omitted).

To the contrary, we have repeatedly said that “appellate counsel does not have a duty to include all possible claims on direct appeal, but rather is permitted to argue only the most meritorious claims.” (brackets eliminated) (); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 , 103 S.Ct.