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But “[d]ue process does not always require a full evidentiary hearing.” (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976)).

But “[d]ue process does not always require a full evidentiary hearing.” (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976)).

(providing that the “general purpose of bail is to permit a defendant’s release pending trial if his appearance at trial can be otherwise guaranteed”).

“Because a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense, it follows that the defendant also has a right to offer the testimony of witnesses that supports the defendant’s position.”

(reasoning that bail issues are moot after a conviction, including whether bail was excessive).

d 504, 512 (Minn. 2009) (“[T ]he rules cannot diminish Constitutional protection.”).

(“Generally, issues of bail are considered moot after conviction.”).

The state and federal Due Process Clauses are textually similar, and the supreme court has described the scope of their protections as “identical.” Turner v. Comm’r of Revenue, 12

“The judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 322, 96 S. Ct. at 897; (“Due process does not always require a full evidentiary hearing.”).

(“[B]ail issues are considered moot after the defendant’s conviction.”).

Indeed, the right to present a complete 9 defense specifically encompasses “the right to call witnesses.” (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

(stating that, at a bail hearing, “a defendant may only call a witness if the defendant makes a persuasive offer of proof that the witness’s testimony, when considered in the context of all the other relevant available information, will lead to either release without bail or a reduction in the bail am