Cited by

We held that suppression was not warranted

–11 (Minn. 2002), and findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, see also Minn. R. Civ.

(citing State v. Buckingham , ).

Because we defer to the di strict court’s credibility determinations, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, Webb, d at 430, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the district court’s dete rmination that appellant knowingly violated section 243.166.

We “presume that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disb elieved any contrary evidence.”

See State v. Buckingham , (“[D]etermining the credibility or reliability of a witness lies with the jury alone.”).

See State v. Buckingham , (“[D]etermining the credibility or reliability of a witness lies with the jury alone.”).

(“[D]etermining the credibility or reliability of a witness lies with the jury alone.”).

We defer to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations, and will not disturb a verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, d 515, 519 (Minn. 2013), and we defer to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations, 2 To support Mikiska’s conviction, the state was required to prove that (1) Mikiska was required to register as a predatory offender; (2) the time period during which he was required to register had not elapsed; (3) he knowingly violated the vehicle-registration requirement; and (4) the vio

We “presume that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence.”

ota Supreme Court restated and clarified this state’s established legal principles regarding police post-arraignment contact with an accused who is represented by counsel: “Police may speak with a defendant, even after appointment of counsel, so 8 long as the defendant does not clearly assert a desire to deal with the police only through counsel.” ().

We must assume that “the jury believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence.”

We need not address the state’s first argument concerning whether Compardo was in custody because, given the facts in the district court record and the parties’ respective arguments, it is clear that, even if there is a Scales violation, the violation is not “substantial.” (“We need not determine if there was a Scales violation here because, if there was, it was not substantial.”).

Specifically, we review questions of law de novo, -11 (Minn.2002), and we *35 review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, see also Minn. R. Civ.

“[W]here gang evidence is relevant as to motive, it may be admitted.” (-35 (Minn.1998)).