Cited by

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); (describing requirements of right to confrontation as set forth in Crawford).

The “admission of testimonial statements does not implicate the Confrontation Clause if the statements are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”

And although we need not conclusively define every contour of the right to present a complete defense in this case, we reiterate that the right is grounded in principles of “fundamental fairness” and includes the “right to present evidence.” (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984))

Generally, “past-crimes evidence is only relevant to attack a witness’s credibility or character for truthfulness and may be used only to impeach a witness.” State v. Swaney , (citing Minn. R. Evid.

Due process grants all criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(concluding that a prosecutor’s remarks about inferences to be drawn from the evidence were permissible).

16 evidence.” (quotation omitted).

The party must show that the prior crimes or bad acts are “sufficiently similar to the charged crime in terms of time, place, or modus operandi.”

“[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts separate from the crime charged is not admissible to ‘p rove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.’” State v. Swaney , (quoting Rule 404(b)).

The state’s explanation finds support in cases in which similar evidence about a law-enforcement officer’s investigation was not deemed hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter assert ed. See, , 552 -53 (Minn. 2010 ); State v. Ford , , 615 (Minn. 1982).

Rebuttal evidence offered by the state is defined as evidence that “explains, contradicts, or refutes the defendant’s evidence.” (quotation omitted).

However, the s tate concedes that the district court erred when it determined that J.Z.’s statements were admissible evidence because J.Z.’s statements were “testimonial” for Crawford purposes.2

“[E]vidence of an alternative perpetrator’s other crim es, wrongs, or bad acts —sometimes called reverse - Spreigl evidence—is admissible to cast reasonable doubt upon the identification of the defendant as the person who committed the charged crime.” d 541, 557 (Minn. 2010) (quotation and emphasis omitted).

5 Defendants must be given a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense through the introduction of evidence.

See, (concluding statement that “something was wrong” if victim did not call his friend was not h earsay because it was offered to explain friend’s efforts to locate the victim); (concluding that of ficer’s testimony about statements by defendant’s wife was not hearsay because it was offered to provide context and explain why wife confronted defendant on the phone).

“[I]n general, rebuttal evidence consists of that which explains, contradicts, or refutes the defendant’s evidence.” (quotation omitted).

A district court “violates the Confrontation Clause when it admits testimony that inescapably implies a nontestifying witness’s testimonial hearsay statement.”

“In general, rebuttal evidence consists of that which explains, contradicts, or refutes the defendant’s evidence.” (quotation omitted).

Stated differently, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees that testimonial statements made by a witness unavailable to testify at trial are inadmissible unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.” (citation omitted).

Violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to a harmless error analysis, and “reversal is not required if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

If evidence has been admitted in violation of the 8 Confrontation Clause, it is subject to harmless error analysis and does not require reversal “if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” d 541, 555 (Minn. 2010).

6 “[I]n general, rebuttal evidence consists of that which explains, contradicts, or refutes the defendant’s evidence.” (quotation omitted).

But prosecutors may “state conclusions and inferences which the human mind may reasonably draw from the facts in evidence.” d 541, 561 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

-61 (Minn. 2010) (concluding a prosecutor did not commit misconduct by eliciting certain testimony because the evidence was relevant and admissible).

Prosecutors may, however, “state conclusions and inferences which the human mind may reasonably draw from the facts in evidence.” d 541, 561 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted); (“[C]ounsel may use all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze 5 and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom during closin