Cited by

See id.; (stating that this court will review an unobjected-to error under the “plain error test”); (applying plain-error to review Confrontation Clause issue when the objection at trial was on hearsay grounds and declining to consider the effect of a hearsay objection on the appropriate standard of review); -64 (Minn. 2008) (applying plain-error standard of

Hull , (“We apply an identical analysis under both the state and federal Confrontation Clauses.”).

VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; (noting that confrontation claims are analyzed the same under the federal and state constitutions).

VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; (noting that Confrontation Clause claims are analyzed the same under the federal and state constitutions).

VI, and the Minnesota Constitution, Minn. Const. art. I, § 6, guarantee criminal defendants the right to confront the witnesses against them through “a face -to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988); (stating that appellate courts apply the same analysis to state and federal Confrontation Clauses).

VI; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; (“We apply an identical analysis under both the state and federal Confrontation Clauses.”).

VI; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; (“We apply an identical analysis under both the state and federal Confrontation Clauses.”).

VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; (stating that appellate courts apply same analysis to state and federal confrontation clauses).

VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; (“We apply an identical analysis under both the state and federal Confrontation Clauses”).

VI ; see Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; see also State v. Hull , (“We apply an identical analysis under both the state and federal Confrontation Clauses.”).

Id.; (applying plain-error review when the defendant objected on hearsay grounds but did not assert a confro ntation objection); State v. Tscheu , , 864 (Minn. 2008) (concluding no plain error because the guilty verdict was surely unattributable to the Confrontation Clause violations).

VI; see Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; see also State v. Hull , (“We apply an identical analy sis under both the state and federal Confrontation Clauses.”).

State v. Hull , , 103 (Minn. 2010).

“No precise definition of ‘testimonial’ appears in Crawford, but the [United States Supreme] Court said that an accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” (quotation omitted).

V I ; see Minn. Const. art. I, § 6 (containing nearly identical langu age as the United State Const itution); (“We apply an identical analy sis under both the state and federal Confrontation Clauses.”).

VI; see Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; see also State v. Hull , (“We apply an identical analysis under both the state and federal Confrontation Clauses.”) .

See Mosley, d at 797; (applying plain-error review to confrontation- clause issue where appellant only objected on hearsay grounds).

State v. Hull , (noting that “other state courts have held that a hearsay objection at trial is not sufficient to preserve a confrontation clause objectio n on appeal” but declining “to decide the effect, if any, of the hearsay objection on the appropriate standard of review on appeal” when both parties agreed t

6 error was plain, and (3) the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights.”

VI; accord Minn. Const. art. I, § 6 ; State v. Hull , (stating that analysis of Confrontation Clause claim is the same under either the United States or Minneso ta Constitution).

See, (concluding statement that “something was wrong” if victim did not call his friend was not h earsay because it was offered to explain friend’s efforts to locate the victim); (concluding that of ficer’s testimony about statements by def

See State v. Hull , (discussing second prong of Frye-Mack where admissibility of te st result depends on whet her lab conducting test complied with appropriate standards and controls).

VI; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; (stating that the analysis of a Confrontation Clause claim is the same whether it is brought under the federal or Minnesota constitution).

14 art. I, § 6; (stating that analysis of a Confrontation-Clause claim is the same under either the federal or Minnesota constitution).

Moreover, as the state points out, 2 Appellant also relied on a 2009 report of the National Academy of Sciences, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, -10 (Minn. 2010) (Meyer, J., concurring)

The Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (2004); (explaining that Minnesota courts apply “an identical analysis under both the state and federal Confrontation Clauses”).

Deprived the Defendant of a Fair Trial DeLaCruz claims that he was prejudiced when several jurors saw him escorted into the courtroom by two uniformed officers in hand restraints on two separate occasions, and 18 that he therefore should have been granted a mistrial.9 The supreme court rejected a -06 (Minn. 2010) (distinguishing the use of restraints inside the courtroom from the use of restraints during transport to or from the courtroom, which “is likely to be seen for just what it is—standard

(holding that out-of-court statements identifying a suspect and made to “a police officer investigating a theft” are testimonial under Crawford (emphasis added)).

An error raised initially on appeal is reviewed under a plain-error analysis “and warrants reversal if: (1) an error occurred in the district court, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights.”

If these three prongs are satisfied, we then determine “whether the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding before granting relief.” (quotation omitted).

fendant failed to preserve for review on direct appeal a claim that his right of confrontation was violated when defendant’s objection to admission of victim’s statements was based solely on the residual hearsay exception and it was not apparent from the context of defendant’s argument that the Confrontation Clause was the basis for defendant’s challenge to evidence); (holding that “a hearsay objection at trial is not sufficient to preserve a confrontation clause objection on appeal” (quotation

The federal and state constitutions prohibit “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365 (2004); -02 (Minn. 2010) (noting that federal courts and Minnesota courts apply the same analysis to Confrontation Clause claims); see U.S. Const. amend.

Moreover, “the Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” (quotation omitted).