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Appellate courts “review a decision by the district court ‘to depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence for an abuse of discretion.’” ().

“Prosecutors may not elicit credibility-vouching testimony from trial witnesses.” rev’d on other grounds

“Prosecutors may not elicit credibility-vouching testimony from trial witnesses.” rev’d on other grounds

Rosillo relies here, as he did in the district court, d 147, 152 (Minn. 2011), -96 (Minn. 2009).

“Prosecutors may not elicit credibility-vouching testimony from trial witnesses.” rev’d on other grounds

An offense is committed “in the presence of” a minor only if “the child sees, hears, or otherwise witnesses some portion of the commission of the offense in question.”

9 “Prosecutors may not elicit credibility-vouching testimony from trial witnesses.” rev’d on other grounds

“The interpretation of case law is a legal question that is reviewed de novo.” d 147, 150 (Minn. 2011).

“The interpretation of case law is a legal question that is reviewed de novo.”

“Prosecutors may not elicit credibility-vouching testimony from trial witnesses.” rev’d on other grounds

- 95 (Minn. App. 2010), rev’d

State v. Robideau , Best, d at 427.

But, when the jury found Hubbard guilty of first -degree manslaughter, it also found that “the defendant’s act was committed in the presence of a child.” “[C]ommission of an offense in the p resence of a child may be a valid reason to depart from the presumptive sentence.”

Applying this rule, this court has held that “[p]rosecutors may not elicit credibility-vouc hing testimony from trial witnesses.” State v. Robideau , rev’d on other grounds

State v. Robideau , , 150 (Minn. 2011).

A defendant commits a crime “in the presence” of a child if the child “saw, heard, or otherwise witnessed the offense,” or “some portion of the commissi on of the offense in question.”

But appellate courts “review a decision by the district court to depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence for an abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted).

The supreme court has observed that “a durational departure may be warranted when an offense is committed in the presence of a child in two situations.”

Presence of children is a valid aggravating factor when a child can “see, hear, or otherwise witness any portion of the commission of the offense.”

A defendant commits a crime “in the presence” of a child if the child “saw, heard, or otherwise witnessed the offense,” 3 Vance, d at 394, or “some portion of the commission of the offense in question,” (emphasis added).