Cited by

(stating that “there is a strong presumption that appellate counsel’s judgment about which issues to raise falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” (quotation omitted)); (explaining that “appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise issues that themselves have no merit”).

at 859–62; –43 (Minn. 2010) 2 (Evans II).

Evans v. State , (M inn.

Appellate counsel “is not ineffective for failing to raise issues that themselves have no merit.”

The Knaffla rule bars a postconviction ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim when the claim is based solely on the trial record and thus, the claims were known, or should have been known, and brought, on direct appeal.2

6 692, 695 (Minn. 1997), when the source of the information was present with the defendant at the scene of the crime , Whittaker, d at 671 ; see also Evans v State , (“Our precedent recognizes that if the source of the ‘newly discovered’ evidence was with the defendant at the scene of the crime, the first prong of the Rainer analysis is not met.”).

Appellate counsel “is not ineffective for failing to raise issues that themselves have no merit.”

See Evans v. State , (stating that “[o]ur precedent recognizes that if the source of the newly discovered evidence was with the defendant at the scene of the crime,” it is not newly discovered evidence (quotation omitted)).

-45 (2010); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).

See Evans v. State ( Evans III ), ; Evans v. State ( Evans II )

Counsel’s performance presumably falls “within a wide range of reasonable representation.” Evans 14 v. State

that, if proved, would show both that counsel’s performance was not objectively reasonable and, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” - 45 (Minn. 2010) (quotation om itted).

See, e.g. , Evans v. State , , 49 (Minn. 2010) (holding that evidence is not "newly discovered" if the petitioner was admittedly present at the time of the events in question (citations omitted) ).

Zenanko , d at 865 ; see also Evans v. State , , 45 (Minn. 2010) (imposing duty on appellate counsel only to bring the most meritorious claims, not every possible claim).

843 n.3 (Minn. 2005); -35 , 135 n.3 (Minn. 2004).

at Lynch was denied a right to counsel at that hearing , Lynch cannot show either, first, that “appellate counsel’s representation fell below an objec tive standard of reasonableness” or, second, that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Arredondo, d at 571; (stating that “appellate counsel is not ineffective for fa iling to raise issues that themselves have no merit”); (concluding that appellat

Under the interests-of-justice exception to the Knaffla rule, the court may review a claim as fairness requires when the claim has substantive merit and the 16 petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue in the direct appeal or a previous postconviction petition.9

We affirmed Evans’s conviction on direct appeal, State v. Evans (Evans I), and the district court’s subsequent denial of his first postconviction petition, Evans v. State (Evans II)

(describing showing for third newly discovered evidence factor as requiring the evidence to be “material”).