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nal rights were violated during a stop and search when law enforcement found her slumped with her head leaning back in a parked car on a busy street); (analyzing, on remand from the supreme court, whether article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution offers more protection than the Fourth Amendment), aff’d, 4 In that case, Gale moved to suppress the evidence obtained from a stop and search, arguing, among other things, that the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement did not jus

“When an appellant brings an as-applied challenge, review of the statute is limited to whether the statute impermissibly burdens the appellant’s right based on the facts presented by the case at hand.” d 732, 736 (Minn. App. 2025); (distinguishing between facial and as-applied challenges).

As support, UH quotes the following line from the supreme court’s post -remand decision in McCaughtry II out of context: “In McCaughtry I, we held that appellants’ claim was ripe because their facial challenge presented ‘a purely legal question that does not require the development of a factual record.’” (McCaughtry II) (quoting McCaughtry I, d at 339).

(describing facial challenges).

And the supreme court has since repeatedly explained that “[j]usticiability is separate and distinct from the merits of the case.” Clapp, d at 652 (citing Cruz-Guzman, d at 7); see 12 (McCaughtry II) (“Because the issue of justiciability goes to a court’s power to hear a case at all, it is a separate and distinct question from the merits of the suit.”).

“Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons.” (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450- 51 (2008)).

We exercise our power to declare laws unconstitutional “with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In responding to a facial challenge, the state “need only demonstrate that [the challenged statute] is constitutional in some of its applications.” Id.

A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is one in which “the challenger bears the heavy burden of proving that the legislation is unconstitutional in all applications.” McCaughtry 8 v. City of Red Wing

Even assuming that pe titioners have asserted a justiciable, viable facial challenge, they face the steep burden of proving that chapter 6132 is “unconstitutional in all applications.” McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing , (quotation omitted) .

McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing , , 522 (Minn. 2013).

and read that decision to require individualized suspicion for administrative search warrants.

“A city ordinance is presumed constitutiona l, and the burden of proving that it is unconstitutional is on the [challenging party].” McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing , (quotation om itted).

“A city ordinance is presumed constitutional, and the burden of proving that it is unconstitutional is on the appellant[].” (quotation omitted).

Relying on the supreme court’s and Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub.

See, (describing the standard for facial challenges).

As we recently noted in McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, “ ‘in a facial challenge to constitutionality, the challenger bears the heavy burden of proving that the legislation is unconstitutional in all applications.’ ” (); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 , 107 S.Ct.