Cited by

to timely make their claim; (3) whether the petitioner is “at fault” for the asserted error and the degree of fault attributable to the opposing party; (4) whether fundamental unfairness “needs to be addressed”; and (5) whether application of the interest s-of-justice exception “is necessary to protect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” -87 (Minn. 2010).

In arguing that he has satisfied this exception, –87 (Minn. 2010).

We 8 The dissenting panel member expressed concern about the panel majority’s

McIntosh argues that the postconviction court failed to apply the correct interests- of-justice test

(looking to our prior cases to determine what must be shown to obtain relief “in the interests of justice” under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

(stating that the court had “identified a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered”); (stating that “the factors identified in Gassler do not form a rigid test and different factors may be dispositive in the unique circumstances of each case

The exception applies only “in exceptional situations.” 586 (Minn. 2010)

at 608 (citing State v. Gassler , -87 (Minn. 2010)).

When assessing whether to grant relief under the interests-of-justice exception, “a claim must have substantive merit and the defendant must not have deliberately and inexcusably failed to raise the issue on direct appeal.” 4 In addition, “courts should weigh the degree to which the party alleging error is at fault for that e rror, the degree of fault assigned to the party defending the alleged error, and whether some fundamental unfairness to the defendant needs to be addressed.” Id.

“[T]o prove a claim by clear and convincing evidence, a party’s evidence should be unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.” d 575, 583 (Minn. 2010).

Appellate courts “have only applied the interests of justice in exceptional situations.”

is met when the truth of the fact to be proven is ‘highly probable.’ ” (citations omitted).

“Clear and convincing” evidence m eans that the truth of the facts asserted is “highly probable.” ().

“[T]o prove a claim by clear and convincing evidence, a party’ s evidence should be unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.”

2(1)(c)b; (stating burden of proof for clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is lower than burden of proof for beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard and requires only th at the alleged facts be “highly probable”).

586 n.11 (Minn. 2010); -75 (Minn. 2010); In re *431 Phillips’ Trust, 252 Minn. 301, 306

d 575, 587 (Minn. 2010) (holding that the integrity of the judicial process did not require review in the interests of justice because “there was substantial admissible evidence of [defendant’s] guilt admitted at trial”).

Clear and convincing evidence is “unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.”

This exception applies only in “exceptional situations.”

A petition is “frivolous” for purposes of the interests-of-justice exception, “if it is perfectly apparent, without argument, that the petition is without merit.” Rickert, 6 d at 241 ().

The interests-of-justice exception applies only “in exceptional situations.”

The interests-of-justice exception applies only in “exceptional circumstances.”

–87 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted); (stating that “the factors identified in Gassler do not form a rigid test” and that “[d]ifferent factors may be dispositive in the unique circumstances of each case”).

The interests-of-justice exception to the general time bar for postconviction relief is only applied in “exceptional situations.”

(holding list of factors is not exclusive).

The state’s evidence was not “unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.”

(–87 (Minn. 2010)), review denied (Minn. Jan.

The interests of justice exception applies only “in exceptional situations.”

To prove innocence under the clear and convincing standard, “a party’s evidence should be unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.” Riley, d at 170 ().

Aberle v. Faribault Fire Dep’t Relief Ass'n, 230 Minn. 353, 359 , State v. Croatt, 227 Minn. 185, 191 , 34 N.

We have previously granted new trials “in the interests of justice when necessary to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.” (-86 (Minn. 1992)).

The supreme court has decided that the interests-of-justice exception only applies in “exceptional situations.”

Clear-and-convincing evidence is a lower standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and it requires only that the alleged facts be “highly probable.” (quotation omitted).

In re Reichmann Land & Cattle, LLP, (“[W]hen the words of a statute are clear, we may not disregard the letter of the law under the pretext of pursuing the law’s spirit.” ()); see also Minn.Stat.