Cited by

(“To be reasonable, the basis of the officer’s suspicion must satisfy an objective, totality - of-the-circumstances test.”).

(articulating that extreme shaking and evasive responses may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the expansion of a traffic stop).

d 346, 351 (Minn. 2012).

Expansion of the scope of the stop is reasonable if it satisfies “an objective[] totality-of- the-circumstances test.”

See State v. Smith , (recognizing that police officers may rely on their training and experience to determine whether a particular factor supports a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).

State v. Smith , -52 (Minn. 2012).

But expansion of the scope of the stop is reasonable if it satisfies “an objective, totality-of-the-circumstances test.” d 346, 351 (M inn.

“[I]nnocent factors in their totality, combined with the investigating officer’s experience in apprehending drug traffickers, can be sufficient bases for finding reasonable suspicion.” (quotation omitted); 354 (Minn. 2012) (stating that driver’s “violent shaking” that appeared to be caused by nervousness and “evasive explanation that he suffer[ed] from a lifelong undiagnosed medical condition” were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion and noting manner in which driver’s

(concluding that a driver’s “violent shaking” during a traffic stop, coupled with “evasive” responses regarding shaking, provided officers with a reasonable, articulable suspicion of illegal activity sufficient to support the expansion of a traffic stop).

Police officers are entitled to rely on their training and experience to determine whether a particular factor supports a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and we are “deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye.” -89 (Minn. 2000).

Police officers are entitled to rely on their training and experience to determine whether a particular factor supports a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and we are “deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye.” -89 (Minn. 2000).

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000); -54 (Minn. 2012).

Under the Minnesota Constitution, “an intrusion not strictly tied to the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the stop permissible must be supported by at least a reasonable suspicion of additional illegal activity.” d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012).

“[Appellate courts] accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.”

But in that review, we accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.”

Reasonableness is evaluated under an objective, totality-of-the-circumstances test, which asks if the facts available to the officer at the time of the stop would “warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” -52 (Minn. 2012) (quotations omitted).

This court “accept[s] the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.”

“Reasonable suspicion must be particularized and based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (quotation omitted).

“To remain constitutional, an intrusion not strictly tied to the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the stop permissible must be supported by at least a reasonable suspicion of additional illegal activity.”