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Moreover, intent to aid can be inferred “from a variety of facts, including presence at the scene of the crime, a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, a lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime with the principal offender.”

State v. Bahtuoh , , 821 (Minn. 2013).

Second, the court determines “whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.”

“[T]he district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial.”

-20 (Minn. 2013) (considering the strength of the s tate’s evidence when determin ing whether the district court abused its discretion by denying a motion for a mistrial).

(alleged prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the prosecutor “did not refer to the [prejudicial] answer at any other point in the trial ”); (a prejudicial comment did not entitle the defendant to a mistrial where it was “isolated and brief” and uttered only once in a four- day trial).

See Huber , 877 *d at 525 (“[T]he State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Huber knew the other person was going to commit ...(emphasis added)); Kelley, d at 283 (requiring the state to prove the defendant “knew his friend was going to commit the robbery” (emphasis added)); (requiring the state to prove that the defendant knew his alleged accomplices “were going to commit a crime” (emphasis added)); (requiring proof that the defendant “knew that his alleged accomplices were going to com

(stating that “the number and severity of the wounds” established intent to commit murder).

Whether a defendant intend ed to aid and abet may be inferred “from a variety of facts, including presen ce at the scene of the crime, a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, a lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime with the principal offender.”

(concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied mistrial motion where disputed evidence “was isolated and 12 brief,” occurring once during four-day trial).

- 20 (Minn. 2013) (stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a mistrial based on an isolated incident where the state introduced evidence that the defendant was present at the scene of another shooting that occurred the same 7 night as the murder with which he was cha

“[T]he district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial.” ().

.” d 645, 659 (Minn. 2006) (noting that the fact-finder can infer intent from the “defendant’s flight from the scene of the crime with the principal”).

.” (noting that the fact-finder can infer intent from the “defendant’s flight from the scene of the crime with the principal” (quotation omitted)).

-20 (Minn. 2013) (stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a mistrial based on an isolated incident where the State introduced evidence that the defendant was present at the scene of another shooting that occurred the same night as the murder with which he was charge

“[Appellate courts] review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion because the district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, 3 of an event occurring during the trial.”

“A jury may infer the requisite state of mind from a variety of facts, including presence at the scene of the crime, [and] a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime.”

“The State ordinarily proves a [person]’s mental state by circumstantial evidence.”

The issue in our case is similar to that in State v. Bahtuoh, in which the district court failed to “expressly instruct the jury on the two components of the mental state required for accomplice liability.”

“Even if the answer to all three inquiries is ‘yes,’ [appellate courts] will order a new trial only if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

“The State ordinarily proves a criminal defendant’s mental state by circumstantial evidence.”

(“We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion because the district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial.”).2 Before applying the abuse-of-discretion standard of review to the distric

bility, “[a] jury may infer the requisite state of mind 8 from a variety of facts, including presence at the scene of the crime, a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, a lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime with the principal offender.”

-11 (Minn. 2013) (describing how to apply the circumstantial-evidence standard to an accomplice-liability case).