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To the contrary, requiring appellate counsel to raise every “colorable” claim rather than weeding out weaker ones disserves the goal of “vigorous and effective advocacy.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983)

“[A] defendant may be entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial if the improper admission of evidence at trial so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” (quotation omitted).

See Jackson v. State , (stating that we can dispose of an ineffectiv e-assistance-of-counsel claim if one prong is not met).

Zornes, d at 371; (“[O]ur court has never held, and we find no authority holding, that appellate counsel is under a duty to raise federa l constitutional claims in a st ate-court appeal simply to preserve those issues for federal habeas review.”).

We may address the Strickland prongs in either order and “dispose of a claim on one prong without analyzing the other.”

does not generally bar claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in a first postconviction petition.” n.4 (Minn. 2012).

n.3 (Minn. 2012); (“Issues not addressed by a party’s brief are considered waived, and we will not address those .