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“The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.” (quotation omitted).

A collateral attack is “[a]n attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal.” Black’s Law Dictionary 331 (12th ed. 2024) (defining collateral attack); (applying this definition in the context of a collateral attack on an order), aff’d, d 177 (Minn. 2013).

to support his contention that he was denied procedural due process because the district court did not issue the DANCO in a separate proceeding.

XIV, § 1; (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).

Accordingly, a statute is unconstitutionally vague “ ‘if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits’ ” or “ ‘if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)).

There are two reasons why a statute may be ruled unconstitutionally vague: “First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits; and second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (quotation omitted).

y and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965)), aff’d

aff’d, in which we stated generally that “a party’s failure to appeal the issuance of a court order precludes a collateral attack on that order in a subsequent proceeding.” Id.

A vague law may violate due process “for either of two independent reasons: ‘First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits;’ and ‘[s]econd, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)).

See Minn. Stat. § 629.75 (2022) (providing for 8 DANCOs); (noting that OFPs are issued in a civil proceeding whereas DANCOs are issued in criminal proceedings), aff’d, .

issuance of a pretrial DANCO in a subsequent proceeding for violation of that DANCO.”), aff’d on other grounds

State v. Ness , , 181 (Minn. 2013).

State v. Ness , , 181 (Minn. 2013) (quoting Soohoo v. Johnson , , 821 (Minn. 2007) ).

See State v. Ness , , 228 (Minn. App. 2012), aff'd

Nothing prevented Schloegl—after discharging his public defender—from “moving the court to modify or lift the [no-contact order].” aff’d d 177 (Minn. 2013).

“The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.” (quotation omitted).

“As a general rule, a party’s failure to appeal the issuance of a court order precludes a collateral attack on 5 that order in a subsequent proceeding.” (quotation omitted), aff’d