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I. “[T]he existence of a justiciable controversy is essential to our exercise of jurisdiction.” -34 (Minn. 2014).

Courts may ordinarily exercise jurisdiction only over justiciable controversies, –34 (Minn. 2014), and a moot controversy is not justiciable, Snell, d at 283.

e raw material (including effective presentation of both sides of the issues raised) traditionally associated with effective judicial decision-making.” see also Snell, d at 284 (determining case to be functionally justiciable because “the issues are primarily legal and were well-briefed by the parties”); (determining question to be functionally 7 Because OCM has the burden, we limit our analysis to the exceptions raised by OCM.

The court’s duty is to “interpret the policy that the Legislature has already determined in the statutory language at issue.” n.10 (Minn. 2014).

The court’s duty is to “interpret the policy that the Legislature has already determined in the statutory language at issue.” n.10 (Minn. 2014).

d at 280–81; (“[W]e have authority to decide cases that are technically moot when those cases are functionally justiciable and present important questions of statewide significance.”).

Courts may ordinarily exercise jurisdiction only over justiciable controversies, –34 (Minn. 2014), and a moot case is not justiciable

(“We have dismissed appeals for lack of jurisdiction where the issues in the case were moot.”).

Though the di ssent contends that our decision takes a “piecemeal approach” that “provides Minnesota lawyer s and litigants incomplete guidance,” we only “decide actual controversies.” In re Guardianship of Tschumy

(applying de novo review in a guardianship context).

10 Hayden, d at 796 ( n.10 (Minn. 2014)).

d 728, 731-33, 741 (Minn. 2014).

Capable of repetition Minnesota Supreme Court precedent instructs that appellate courts must conduct a “careful analysis of all aspects of the issues presented before we determine whether to dismiss the case or exercise our discretion to consider the appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine.”

-41 (Minn. 2014) (discussing cases, including Tschumy, that present an issue of public importance and statewide significance).

The district court declined to apply the mootness doctrine because it held that this case is “functionally justiciable and present[s] important questions of statewide significance,”

In re Guardianship of Tschumy

Our mootness doctrine is “flexible and discretionary; it is not a mechanical rule that we invoke automatically.”

The court’s duty is to “interpret the policy that the Legislature has already determined in the statutory language at issue.” See In re Guardianship of Tschumy , n.10 (Minn. 2014).

In re Guardianship of Tschumy , , 741 n.10 (Minn. 2014).

But standing is the “requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation .” In re Guardianship of Tschumy , (quotation omitted) (emphasis added).

-41 (Minn. 2014) (reaching the merits of a moot issue to clarify the scope of guardians’ authority to remove life-support from a ward—“one of life’s most fundamen tal decisions”—because there w ere thousands of wards under the state’s supervision); (decid

In re Guardianship of Tschumy , , 734 (Minn. 2014).

In re Guardianship of Tschumy , , 733-34 (Minn. 2014).

See In re Guardianship of Tschumy , , 740-41 (Minn. 2014) (reaching merits of a moot issue to clarify the scope of guardians' authority to remove life-support for a ward because of the thousands of wards within the state); Kahn v. Griffin , , 823 (Minn. 2005) (considering merits of an election procedure because it was similar to procedure

Safety, , 439 (Minn. 2002); Rud, -76; 740 (Minn. 2014); Leino, d at 16 481.

Our conclusion that Glaze's death terminated the attorneys' authority to act on his behalf is not inconsistent with In re Guardianship of Tschumy

-“Standing must exist at all stages of the litigation, including when a plaintiff brings a cause of action and when a party appeals a decision.” (quotation omitted).

See In re Guardianship of Tschumy , –34 (Minn. 2014).

When we review a statute, we are limited to “interpret[ing] the policy that the Legislature has already determined in the statutory language at issue.” n.10 10 (Minn. 2014).

Bennett v. Brown, 216 Minn. 135, 138

(Stras, J., dissenting) (noting that in circumstances “in which there is no case or controversy, it is our duty under the Minnesota Constitution to dismiss the appeal”).