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“The purpose of official immunity is to protect public officials from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” (quotation omitted).

6 B. Discretionary or Ministerial The distinction between a discretionary and ministerial duty is “a nebulous and difficult one.” (quotation omitted).

Applying these principles to the snowplowing context, Minnesota caselaw seeks to avoid “deterring snowplow drivers from exercising their judgment when making the difficult decisions that may arise in the often-hazardous activity of snow removal.” Shariss v. City of Bloomington

284 (Minn. App. 2014) (applying de novo review to an assertion of vicarious official immunity); (applying de novo review to an assertion of statutory immunity).

“A duty is discretionary if it involves ‘individual professional judgment that necessarily reflects the professional goal and factors of a situation.’” (quoting Mumm, d at 490-91).

“A duty is discretionary if it involves individual professional judgment that necessarily reflects the professional goal and factors of a situation.” (quotation omitted).

“When reviewing a denial of summary judgment based on a claim of immunity, we assume the facts alleged by the nonmoving party are true.”

“When reviewing a denial of summary judgment based on a claim of immunity, we assume the facts alleged by the nonmoving party are true.” Shariss v. City of Bloomington

Shariss v. City of Bloomington

Louis C ty., -08 (Minn. 2006) -82 (Minn. App. 2104)).

We therefore “assume the facts alleged by the nonmoving party are true.”

6 incomplete and confusing information such that the situation requires the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion.” (quotations omitted).

5 (affirming summary judgment denying official immunity and vicarious official immunity after concluding that backing up a snow plow to give a school bus room to pass was a ministerial function) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

-83 (Minn. App. 2014) (holding that snowplow operator’s decision to move in reverse to avoid obstructing traffic was ministerial because it did not “involve[] the sort of complex, selective decision-making that is protected by common-law official immunity”).