Cited by

Speech in this category is unprotected when it is “direc tly linked to and de signed to facilitate the commission of a crime.”

broad but that a mail-harassment statute was not); Hensel, d at 170, 181 (holding that the disturbance-of-assembly statute was facially unconstitutional); State v. Muccio , –29 (Minn. 2017) (holding that a statute criminalizing electronic communication directed at a child that describes sexual conduct was not facially unconstitutional); State v. Washington-Davis , 540–41 (Minn. 2016) ( holding that a statut e prohibiting solicitati on and promotion of prostitution was not uncons titutionally ove

“To satisfy the third prong of the plain-error test, [Barthman] bears the ‘heavy burden’ of showing there is a ‘reasonable likelihood that [the error] had a significant effect on the jury verdict.’ ” (); –82 (Minn. 2015)

at 928 (citation omitted); d 531, 533, 539 (Minn. 2016) (holding that “Minnesota Statutes § 609.322, subd.

We recognize that the stalking-by-telephone statute also criminalizes stalking conduct, and the supreme court has upheld statute s that criminalize conduct when it is “directly linked to and designed to facilitate the commission of a crime.” ( upholding promotion-of-prostitution statute because it regulates spe ech “aimed at furthering the commission of a crime” ); (upholding solicitation-of-children statute because it regulates communication that “is both linked to and desi

Under the circumstantial-evidence test, this court first identifies the circumstances proved by deferring to the fact-finder’s “acceptance of the proof of the circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” (quotations omitted).

State v. Washington-Davis , , 538 (Minn. 2016) (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island , 517 U.S. 484 , 489 n.1, 116 S.Ct.

One exception to this general rule is “immediate-episode evidence.” State v. Washington–Davis, , aff’d, d 531 (Minn. 2016) .

’” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd.

State v. Washington-Davis , , 538 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

One exception to this general rule is “ immediate-episode evidence.” aff’d, d 531 (Minn. 2016) .

If the defendant is able to satisfy these first three prongs, this court may “correct the error only if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (quotation omitted).

Under that standard, “we determine whether the jury instructions (1) contained an error, (2 ) that was plain, and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”

28 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d

State v. Washington-Davis , aff’d

Even if Williams establishes these three prongs, we will correct the plain error “only if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (quotations omitted).

Ev en if Jackson establishes these three prongs, “we may correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Washington-Davis

If all three prongs of the plain-error analysis are satisfied, the reviewing court “may correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Further, “[i]f the defendant establishes these three prongs, we may correct the error only if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).