Cited by

Similarly, in State v. Otto , the supreme court held that the legislature ’s intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine was “crystal clear” because the legislature stated that the relevant sections became “effective August 1, 2016, and appl[ied] to crimes committed on or after that date .” (quotation omitted).

2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 15, § 13, at 1051; (holding that the legislature abrogated the amelioration doctrine when it specified that certain sections of the Drug Sentencing Reform Act “became ‘effective August 1, 2016, and appl[y] to crimes committed on or after that date”).

7 “The amelioration doctrine applies an amendment mitigating punishment to acts committed prior to that amendment’s effective date, if there has not been a final judgment reached in the case.”

(quotation omitted); see also Kirby, d at 495 (surveying cases that looked at “the specific provision affecting the criminal defendant” when applying the amelioration doctrine).

Since Kirby, –04 (Minn. 2017), and State v. Robinette , –51 (Minn. 2021).

tence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines is determined by reference to a grid with two axes: (1) the severity of the current offense (“primary factor”) and (2) the defendant’s criminal-history score 4 Besides the arguments discussed below, the state argues that the amelioration doctrine is inapplicable, as explained in State v. Kirby

defendant’s sentence by 9 years after amendments to Minnesota’s anti- sodomy statute mandated application of the amelioration doctrine); (same ); Kirby, d at 496 (applying amelioration to a defendant’s sentence based on the 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act, Act of May 22, 2016, ch. 160, § 18, 2016 Minn. Laws 576, 590 –91); (same ).

The amelioration doctrine applies to crimes co mmitted before an amendment’s 5 effective date if “(1) there is no statement by the Legislature that clearly establishes its intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine; (2) the amendment mitigates punishment; and (3) final judgment has not been entere d when the amendment takes effect.” 1 The only dispute here is condition one: wh ether the legislature clearly stated its intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine in connection with the 2019 amen

The amelioration doctrine applies to crimes co mmitted before an amendment’s effective date if “(1) there is no statement by the Legislature that clearly establishes its intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine; (2) the amendment mitigates punishment; and (3) final judgment has not been entere d when the amendment takes effect.”

As for the two-year limitation on the availability of this exception, Jones argues that her claim did not arise until July 26 , 2017—when the Minnesota Supreme Court released its decisions in State v. Kirby , and State v. O tto

See 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 1-22, at 576-92; State v. Otto , (discussing the DSRA).

(citing 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 3-4, at 577-81).

2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 1-22, at 576-92; (discussing the DSRA).

(citing 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 3-4).

d at 496; (holding that “for the reasons discussed in Kirby” the amelioration doctrine required 10 Section 18 of the DSRA provides that the section “is effective the day fo llowing final enactment.” 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 18, at 591.

If we were to consider this issue, we would reject Sanchez-Sanchez’s argument that the postconviction court erred by not vacating his sentence under the DSRA.3 d 501, 502, 504 (Minn. 2017) (vacating and remanding for resentencing under the DSRA when defendant received bottom -of-the-box sentence); (reversing and remanding for resentencing under the DSRA because DSRA reduced the preemptive sentence applicable to defendant wh

The postconviction court denied Reynolds’s petition , reasoning that, the DSRA does not apply to Reynolds’s sentenc e because judgment in his case became final before May 23, 2016, the date the DSRA became effective.

d before the 2016 amendment, bu t before their final adjudication, if three conditions are satisfied: “(1) there is no statement by the Legislature that clearly establishes the Legislature’s intent to abrogate t he amelioration doctrine; (2) the amendment mitigates punis hment; and (3) final judgment has not been entered as of the date the amendment takes effect.” Id.; (reiterating the test set forth in Kirby and declining to apply the amelioration doctrine to other sections of the DSRA when the

See State v. Otto , , 504 (Minn. 2017).

(“[T]he plain language of DSRA §§ 3-4 forbids application of the increased weight threshold to offenses committed prior to August 1, 2016.”).

Second, in both Kirby and its companion case, State v. Otto, sentencing occurred in 2014 and 2015 respectively, well before those appellants could have raised the issue before appeal , and the court remanded each case for resentencing .1 Kirby, d at 487

However, McDonough withdrew this ground for appeal at oral argument on the basis that State v. Otto , disposed of it.

the supreme court held that sections 3 and 4 of the DSRA do not apply to crimes committed before August 1, 2016, the effective date of those two sections.

and State v. Kirby , , and their analysis does not support Schirmer’s assertion.

The effect of the DSRA on appellant’s conviction “A person convicted of a controlled substance offense for which the controlled substance weight threshold was increased by section 3 of the [DSRA] before his conviction was final is not entitled to have the conviction reversed.”

d 501, 503 (Minn. 2017).

The State raised several of these arguments in a companion case, slip op., , 2017 WL 3161109 (Minn. July 26, 2017), also released today.