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The third case is State v. Olson, in which we concluded that the direct-evidence standard of review applied “because the state presented direct evidence of Olson’s alcohol consumption and impaired driving through eyewitness testimony.”

Weaver argues that we should apply the de novo standard of review.

Witness testimony may serve as direct evidence “when it reflects a witness’s personal observations and allows the jury to find the defendant guilty without having to draw any inferences.” (applying direct evidence standard of review for eyewitness testifying to defendant’s alcohol consumption and impaired driving); (stating that direct evidence does not become circumstantial even though some level of inference is required

“Direct evidence is evidence based on personal knowledge or observation that, if true, proves a fact without inference.” ( n.11 (Minn. 2004)).

He instead contends that we must apply de novo review to whether his conduct falls within the scope of the stalking statute, relying on this court’s

“Direct evidence is evidence based on personal knowledge or observation that, if true, proves a fact without inference.” ( n.11 (Minn. 2004)).

“Direct evidence is evidence based on personal knowledge or observation that, if true, proves a fact without inference.” (d 7 465, 477 n.11 (Minn. 2004)).

“Direct evidence is evidence based on personal knowledge or observation that, if true, proves a fact without inference.”

(concluding that an officer’s direct observations of indicia of impairment and testimony based on those observations are direct evidence of impairment).

“Direct evidence is evidence based on personal knowledge or observation that, if true, proves a fact without inference.” ( n.11 (Minn. 2004)).

The supreme court has held that a stated threat to kill is direct evidence of intent, because it does not require the jury “to draw any inferences about the purposes of [the defendant’s] actions.” Horst, d at 40; - 98 n.2 (Minn. App. 2016) ( applying Horst to a threats -of- violence conviction for the proposition that a stated threat constitutes direct evidence of 8 intent).

“A threat is a declaration of an intention to injure another or his property by some unlawful act.” (quotation omitted).

(the offense of test refusal, committed after a DWI arrest and test-refusal advisory, is part of the same behavioral incident as the preceding DWI offense) ; accord State v. Olson , d 692, 701 (Minn. App. 2016); 253-54 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept.

Subsequently, this court has consistently held that “ [a driving-while-impaired offense] and test-refusal offense arise from a single behavioral incident and the driver may only be punished for one of the offenses, pursuant to section 609.035.” 253-54 (Minn. App. 2015) (holding that the district court erred in sentencing defendant for driving while impaired, test refusal, and child endangerment because all three offenses arose from the same behavioral inci dent, the defendant’s impaired d

5 See State v. Olson , (approving admission of defendant’s erratic behavior to prove impairment).

See State v. Olson , (“Section 609.035 contemplates that a defendant will be punished for the most ser ious of the offenses arising o ut of a single behavioral incident.” (quotations omitted)).

See State v. Olson , (stating that the state presented direct evidence in the form of eyewitness testimony).

(stating that the state presented direct evidence in the form of eyewitness testimony).

We have referred to this as the “traditional standard of review.”

(driver refused to perform roadside sobriety tests); Johnson v. Comm’r of Pub.

See State v. Olson , -99 (Minn. App. 2016) (not ing that question of whether a statement constitutes a threat depends on the context in which it is used).