Cited by

See generally Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate No. 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, (stating that the Bill of Rights “ ‘protects us against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige.

See, e.g., id.; Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate No. 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (noting that a facial challenge is “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [legislation] would be valid”) (alteration in original)).

6 protected life, liberty, or property interest must provide that individual with notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful way.” Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, (quotation omitted).

d at 69; cf. Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate No. 851LDV, (“The Mathews factors are more than a checklist of items to be ticked through selectively or by rote.”); d 230, 245 (Minn. 2021) (“This is not a check-the-box, prescriptive analysis; rather, we assess how the factors interact with each other in a difficult and sensitive b

Appellate courts review questions regarding “whether procedural due process has been violated de novo.” Olson v. One 1999 Lexus

(discussing the multi-factor balancing test in speedy-trial cases); see also Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)) (observing that the Mathews factors applied in procedural due process cases “are more than a checklist of items to be ticked through selectively or by rote”).

See Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate No. 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, (stating that “[a]t its core, due process requires that the procedures used by the government before depriving an individual of his or her ‘protected life, liberty, or property interest’ must ‘provide [that] individual with notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meanin

Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, d 594, 598 (Minn. 2019); see also Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd.

It “is not a check-the-box, prescriptive analysis.” (discussing the multi-factor balancing test in speedy-trial cases); see also Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, (citing Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 (1976 )) (observing that the Mathews factors applied in procedural due process cases “are more than a checklist of items to be ticked through selectively or by rote.

Olson v. One 1999 Lexus , -04 (M inn.

“We review q uestions of whether procedural due process has been violated de novo.” Olson v. One 1999 Lexus

2 The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained, “At its core, due process requires that the procedures used by the government before depriving an individual of his or her protected life, liberty, or property interest must provide [that] individual with notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful way.” Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

(holding an argument wa ived when not presented to the district court); see also Olson v. One 1999 Lexus , n.8 (Minn. 2019) (discussing th e difference between facial and as-applied due process challenges).

See Olson v. One 1999 Lexus , (noting that due-process protections in forfeiture proceedings exist to protect the public from erroneous or arbitrary deprivation of property).

The appeal from that summary judgment was stayed until the supreme court’s filing of Olson v. One 1999 Lexus , (affir ming this court’s determination that Minn. Stat § 169A.63 , while not constitutionally invalid on its face , violated the due -process rights of the purportedly innocent owner , but reversing the determination that the statute violated the due-process rights of the arrested and convicted driv

The district court also reasoned that our now partially reversed decision in Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate No. 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, aff’d in part and rev’d in part, rendered the state’s 15-month preconviction deprivation of Janssen’s motorcycle unconstitutional on due-process grounds.

See Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, aff’d in part, rev’d in part

319 (1975)); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside , Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (1982) (“A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others”); State, (same); cf. Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, -08 n.8 (Minn. 2019) (reasoning that “it makes sense that in most cases asserting a due process violation based on a deprivation of property .