Cited by

(“It is improper for a prosecutor to ask questions that are calculated to elicit or insinuate an inadmissible and highly prejudicial answer.”); -746 (Minn. 2003).

But “[w]hen the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.” Taylor, d at 20 (quotation omitted); (concluding no violation when “the procedural history of the case makes clear that the delays were the result of [the defendant’s actions]”).

Moreover, “it is improper to inject race into a closing argument when race is not relevant.”

But “[w]hen the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy 8 trial violation.” Taylor, d at 20 (quotation omitted); (concluding that there is no violation when “the procedural history of the case makes clear that the delays were the result of [the defendant’s actions]”).

4 See State v. Jones , (noting that an error is plain if it “is clear or obvious”); (stating that it is plain error for a prosecutor to intentionally elicit inadmissible testimony).

611(c) (“Le ading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness’ testimony.”); State v. Ray , -45 (Minn. 2003) (discussing impropriety of a prosecutor using leading questions to elicit inadmissible testimony).

But “[w]hen the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.” Taylor, d at 20 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Ray , (concluding there is no violation when “the procedural history of the case makes clear that the delays were the result of [the defendant’s actions]”).

Dobbins, d at 512; -47 (Minn. 2003) cited in Dobbins, d at 512, for the proposition that it is improper for the state to highlight a defendant’s racial or socioeconomic status as a way to put evidence in context.

e court has noted that when “the prosecutor invited the jurors to view the entire occurrence as ‘involving three young black males in the hood in North Minneapolis,’ a world wholly outside their own,” the remark “ask[ed] the jury to apply racial and socio-economic considerations that would deny a defendant a fair trial.” (quoting State v. Ray , d 736, 747 (Minn. 2003)).

a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context); n.4 (Minn. 2003) (cautioning defense counsel that “failure to object to improper closing argument may waive any claim of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal”); Lake Superior Ctr.

5 Appellant’s (involved a prosecutor’s “demeaning references” to the defendant’s racial group) is misplaced.

11 for the proposition that the prosecutor improperly aligned herself with the jury.

n.4 (Minn. 2003) (cautioning defense counsel that “failure to object to improper closing argument may waive any claim of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal”).

5 is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.” Taylor, d at 20 (quotation omitted); (concluding that there was no violation of right to speedy trial where “the procedural history of the case makes clear that the delays were the result of defense counsel requests”).

-47 (Minn. 2003) (concluding that a prosecutor’s statements that “[t]his is a dispute .

Appellant argues “the district court’s determination that no prejudice occurred contravenes longstanding Minnesota law looking dimly on parties offering speculative theories through fact witnesses,”

-43 (Minn.2003) (holding that an officer impermissibly attempted to have a suspect revoke his right to counsel when the officer said that the suspect’s invocation of counsel would prevent the police from sharing information with the suspect); , 805 n. 2 (Minn.2001) (concluding it wa