Cited by

d at 13 (d 241, 247 (Minn. 1995) ).

To support a downward departure on the basis of me ntal impairment, the impairment must be “extreme” and deprive the defendant “of control over his actions.” State v. McLaughlin , State v. Lee , .

Caselaw also provides that mental illness justifies mitigating a sentence if the defendant can show the illness deprived him of control over his actions, , or caused him to not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions

and [ the responding officer].” The supreme court has s tated that a district court “can look to events surround ing the crime in making a determination about [a defendant’s] sanity.” Davis v. State , ; State v. Wilson , (“[C]ircumstances surrounding the crime may shed light on [a] defendant’s mental state at the time of the [offense].”).

ly, the record lacks evidence that Royster had a mental impairment 15 that deprived him of “control over his actions.” (stating that “in order to constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, a defendant’s impairment must be ‘extreme’ to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions” (); see also State v. Martinson , review denied (Minn. Jan.

(holding that, while the formal adjudication of a lesser- included offense must be vacated when imposed in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.04, the underlying guilty verdict endures).

In order for mental illness to constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, impairment “must be ‘extreme’ to the point that it de prives the defendant of contro l over his actions.” State v. 8 McLaughlin, () (concluding McLaughlin’s mental health appeared to be “insufficiently extreme” to be a mitigating factor when evidence lacking that M cLaughlin frequently suffered delusions or engaged in wholly irrational behavior).

r before and after crimes, including evidence that the defendant was aware of the consequences of her actions.” State v. Hall , (citing Roberts, d at 869); (“[T]he trial court can look to events surrounding the crime in making a determination about appellant’s sanity.”); State v. Wilson , (“[C]ircumstances surrounding the crime may shed light on defendant’s mental state at the time of the murders.”) .

State v. Roberts , , 869 (Minn. 2016) ( , 820 (Minn. 2009) ; Davis v. State , , 522-24, 527 (Minn. 1999) ; State v. Wilson , , 245-46 (Minn. 1995) ; DeMars v. State , , 15-16 (Minn. 1984) ).

(“[T]he trial court can look to events surrounding the crime in making a determination about appellant’s sanity.”); (“[C]ircumstances surrounding the crime may shed light on defendant’s mental state at the time of the murders.”).

(finding that defendant, who suffered from depression, anger, and impulsivity, did not suffer from extreme mental impairment when “experts overwhelmingly concluded that [his] mental condition did not deprive him of control over his actions”); State v

And the decision that claims are sufficiently proven to create a genuine fact issue is ordinarily not an appealable order.” -13 (Minn.App.1995), aff'd

LaTourelle, d at 284 ; Bowser, d at 779 .

Brom, d at 764-65 (listing cases).

(“[T]his court has only reversed one murder conviction where a defendant suffered from both paranoid schizophrenia and delusions.”).

Finally, we have “consistently affirmed the imposition of consecutive life sentences where a defendant was convicted of multiple victim homicides.”

Determining whether there is a factual basis for the claims “is unrelated to official immunity and is, therefore, not ap-pealable in an interlocutory appeal.” (dismissing police officer’s challenge to district court’s denial of summary judgment because the denial was unrelated to legal questions on official immunity), affd mem.

(requiring defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, "that he did not know the nature of his act or that it was wrong”).

Id.; (holding that, while the formal adjudication of a lesser-included offense must be vacated if imposed in violation of Minn.Stat.

aff'd, , 241 (Minn.1995).

-17 (Minn.1994) (reviewing question of whether claimant’s evidence is sufficient to show that the defendant may not succeed in showing an element of its immunity theory); (without deciding whether review in Baker was appropriate, following Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 , 115 S.Ct.

See, (adopting federal reasoning for separating appeals challenging evidence sufficiency, a fact-based question, from appeals of immunity denials, a legal question) (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 , 115 S.Ct.

6, 1996); (appellate court has no jurisdiction for interlocutory review of denial of summary judgment based on factual issue), (relying on Johnson v. Jones, *310 515 U.S. 304 , —, 115 S.Ct.

-13 (Minn.App.1995) (“An order denying a government official's motion for summary judgment may not be appealed before trial solely on the finding that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the official committed the acts alleged by plaintiff.”), aff'd, (“We do not here consider or determine the appealability of an order denying summary judgment where the genuine issues of material fact identified by the trial court are related to the issue of immunity, and not to the merits of the cl

aff'd this court stated: [W]e find no case law allowing a governmental official an interlocutory appeal from a motion denying summary judgment where the only issue raised on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence on the factual allegations.