Cited by

However, the district court’s sentencing discretion, it is not a “limitless grant of power.” State v. Warren

In Mendoza, we remanded the district court’s denial of a dispositional departure because the district court improperly considered Mendoza’s immigration status during 2 Cosme cites the following opinions: rev. denied (Minn. Apr.

sentences for first degree murder was within the discretion of the district court under Minn. Stat. § 609.15 and subject to appellate review only to ensure consecutive sentences were “commensurate with culpability and not an 13 exaggeration of defendant’s criminality” ()); (reversing the imposition of concurrent life sentences on the grounds that it understated the criminality of a defendant who fatally shot three persons).

(requiring “(1) that the evidence was not known to [the defendant], (2) that his failure to learn of it before trial was not due to the lack of diligence, (3) that the evidence is material * * *, and (4) that the evidence will probably produce either an acquittal at a retrial or results more favorabl

We need not decide whether the district court erred in concluding that petitioner was entitled to postconviction relief in the form of a substantive sentencing hearing because the unique circumstances of this case would warrant the exercise of this court’s inherent supervisory powers to direct that the district court hold a –52 (Minn. 1999).

Regardless of whether an appellant bases their challenge on actual or presumed prejudice , the ultimate test remains “whether [] prospective juror[s] can set aside [their] impression or opinion and render an impartial verdict.” - 48 (Minn. 1999) (concluding motion to 14 transfer venue properly denied when appellant failed to show actual or presumed prejudice); Blom, d at 607 (concluding motions to change venue, continue trial, and sequester jury properly denied when district court took mitigatin

We reversed, holding that Jackson did not preclude consecutive sentences, and remanded to allow the district court to exercise its discretion in determining whether consecutive or concurrent sentences are appropriate

“Sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court absent an abuse of discretion.”

(“Sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court absent an abuse of discretion.”).

onsider, among other things, (1) “whether the pretrial publicity was factual,” (2) “the length of time between the publicity and th e trial,” and (3) “whether any potential prejudice was mitigated at trial, including whether the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to question prospective jurors about the publicity and challenge those not considered impartial.” Id.; (affirming denial of a motion to change venue despite the fact that “[f]ourteen of the fifteen jurors chosen, including altern

He again cites McLaughlin, d at 705, 714, in which the defendant brought his father’s gun to school in a gym bag with the intention to shoot people, , in which the defendant “ drove at least 24 miles to obtain the murder weapon and made it clear to his friends that he planned to shoot the victims .” This argument is not persua sive.

5 The substantive issue of whether Thompson’s –52 (Minn. 1999), is not properly before us. Nothing in our decision today forecloses Thompson from seeking otherwise available relief under the Minnesota postconviction statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2018).

See S –52 (Minn. 1999) (“[G]uided by past sentences imposed on 1 The remedy in Jackson was a form of as-applied severance and revival of the most recent constitutional versions of the relevant statutes.

But although the district court is affo rded great discretion, it is not a “limitless grant of power.” State v. Warren

“Although the abuse of discretion standard is exacting, it is not a limitless grant of power to the trial court.”

But a district court’s broad sentencing discretion “is not a limitless grant of power,” State v. Warren , and appellate courts may reverse a presumptive sentence if warranted by “compelling circumstances.”

Despite the generally valid nature of a sentence within the presumptive range , a presumptive sentence is not unassailable; the supreme court has cautioned that the district court’s broad sentencing discretion “is not a limitless grant of power.”

“Pretrial publicity consisting of factual accounts of the crime is insufficient to establish that the publicity was prejudicial.” State v. 2 Warren

While this court is “loath to interfere” with a district court’s sentencing decision, the discretion afforded to the district court “is not a limitless grant of power,”

-52 (Minn. 1999) (concluding that district court abused discretion by imposing concurrent sentences on three convictions of first-degree murder).

1(a) (2014); (“Sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court absent an abuse of discretion.”); Minn. Sent.

The use of an abuse-of-discretion standard in our review of sentencing decisions, while deferential, “is not a limitless grant of power to the trial court.”

§ 609.15 (2012); (“Sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court absent an abuse of discretion.”); Minn. Sent.