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7 And the Minnesota Supreme Court does “not approve of the practice of admitting ‘mug shots’ or ‘booking photographs,’ particularly if the defendant has already been identified.”

At times, we have stated the standard for the fourth prong of Rule 702 as “ ‘novel or emerging.’ ” Harvey, d at 808 (); Roman Nose, d at 819; (referring to “emerging” techniques only).

See State v. Jobe , n.3 (Minn. 1992) (taking judicial notice of a report issued by the Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science of the National Research Council); Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr, 830 F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that a court ma y take judicial notice of government websites).

and “utilizes a method of DNA analysis not used in a ny of the BCA’s previous testing methods.” 21 The Frye-Mack standard, which was incorporated into Rule 702 in 2006, “governs the admissibility of expert testimony that involves a novel scientific theory,” Doe, d at 156 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), or “emerging scientific techniques,” State v. Jobe

(holding that a defendant’s statement that he did not want to talk about what he did the night before but was willing to talk about “lighter” subjects was not an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent in part because the defendant previously exhibited willingness to talk with police).

(citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923); ).

-15 (Minn.1992) (concluding that otherwise inadmissible reference to defendant’s Miranda warning was *596 admissible as foundation for admission of defendant’s statement of guilt).

12 We disagree on the ground that the Frye-Mack test applies to “evidence based on emerging scientific techniques,” and the technique of using trained dogs to detect drug odors is neither emerging nor scientific.

Instead, Bailey’s complete access to the data, methodology and results of the BCA’s DNA tests satisfied his due process rights under Schivartz, d at 427 (Minn.1989)

2 -68 (Minn.2002); -17 (Minn.1992).

11 In support of his argument, in which we concluded that a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to call witnesses or to contradict testimony because such comments might lead the jury to believe that the defendant has a duty to call witnesses or bears some burden of proof.

Alternatively, the state contends that Day’s statement, “might have reflected his willingness to talk to the agents but only under particular conditions or about particular subjects.” In Jobe , this court held that a suspect did not unambig *750 uously invoke his right to remain silent when he said that “he did not want to discuss the night of the murders but

(holding that graphology “is accorded a low measure of scientific reliability in predicting character or state of mind and is not generally accepted in the scientific fields of psychology and psychiatry”); -20 (Minn.1992) (affirming the district court’s admission of expert testimony based on DNA test results because the principles underlying forensic DNA testing are generally accepted, and the laboratory complied with the appropriate standards and controls, thus rendering the results legally rel

-20 (Minn.1992) (discussing need for compliance with appropriate written protocol and TWGDAM guidelines).

See Wilson, d at 246 ; n.5 (Minn.1992) (holding that consecutive sentences could be appropriate for appellant who stabbed two people to death, one being a 2½-year-old child); (affirming consecutive life sentences for appellant who shot four victims at close range when it was a “mere fortui

(stabbing two people to death, one being a two-and-one-half year old child); Brom, d at 765 (axing four people to death); (methodically burning three people to death); Bangert, d at 546-47 (shooting and killing two victims in their slee

(during custodial police questioning, suspect has the right to stop the questioning at any time).