Cited by

(noting “there can be no question that an arrest pursuant to a valid warrant is supported by probable cause and is therefore reasonable”); n.2 (Minn. 2000) (“Because the deputies had an arrest warrant for [the defendant], and therefore had no discretion regarding whether to arrest him, the search is not rendered invalid because the arrest had not yet been effectuated”).

(citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)) (explaining the inevitable-discovery doctrine and noting that “[o]nce a vehicle is in police custody, warrantless inventory searches are constitutional”).

(concluding that the suppression of a firearm in a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm would have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial).

(citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).

During a search incident to a person’s arrest, police may search the “person’s body and the area within his or her immediate control.” (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).

But exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement are “ ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ ” and “based on particular exigencies of a situation.” State v. Robb , d 96, 100 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455).

-50 (Minn. 2009) (citing State v. Robb , ).

Exceptions to the warrant requirement “are based on particular exigenci es of a situation and must be ‘jealously and carefully drawn.’” State v. Robb , (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1971)).

2034 , 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) ); State v. Robb , , 100 (Minn. 2000).

n.2 (Minn. 2000) (stating that deputies with an arrest warrant “had no discretion regarding whether to arrest” the defendant).

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040 (1969)

ndant maintained responsibility for the vehicle when she was not under arrest and “was present and retained control” of vehicle); Gauster, d at 506 (stating that defendant took responsibility for vehicle when he was not 8 under arrest and “never relinquished control of his vehicle and had no need to leave it unattended”); (concluding that impoundment of vehicle would not have been proper where “[defendant]’s friend, a licensed driver, was at the scene and willing to take responsibility”).

officer testified that, knowing the robbery had involved a gun, he wanted to be “a little more thorough [in his pat search] before [he] put [appellant] in the squad [car].” But, regardless of what the search produced, the officer would have asked appellant his name and run the name through the police computer, thus revealing the warrant; appellant would have been arrested, n.2 (Minn. 2000) (once a warrant is 5 discovered, officers must make an arrest); a search would have been performed incident

An officer is allowed to conduct a search incident to arrest of “a person’s body and the area within his or her immediate control.”

See Gauster, d at 506 (explaining that “the need for the police to protect the vehicle and its contents is often present when police officers arrest a driver” but, conversely, is not present when the driver “was not arrested and therefore never relinquished control of his vehicle and had no need to leave it unattended”); (finding that an impoundment would not be reasonable when a friend was willing and able to take control of the vehicle); Goodrich, d at 511 (concluding that even a defendant who

“One exemption from the warrant require *150 ment is that a person’s body and the area within his or her immediate control may be searched incident to a lawful arrest.” (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S.Ct.

But we “will not overturn a pretrial order of the district court unless ‘the state demonstrates clearly and unequivocally that the [district] court erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.’ ” ().

See, e.g., Anderson, (evidence of impaired driving relating to charges of impaired driving); (suppressed shotgun relating to charges of felonious possession of a firearm); Scott

(probable cause); (search).

2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981)

But where “[t]he district court’s order is based upon an interpretation of law” the appellate court’s “review [is] de novo.” -100 (Minn.2000) (citation omitted).