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It is true, as the state suggests, that if police had stopped Vanguilder for some violation unrelated to drugs and then extended the length of the stop to conduct a narcotics-detection dog sniff outside the van, police could justify the additional intrusion only on “a reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity.” 137 (Minn. 2002).

reasonably related to the investigation of an offense lawfully discovered or suspected durin g the stop,” State v. Askerooth , and only if the officer “develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion” concerning the additional offenses “ ‘within the time necessary to resolve the originally - suspected offense,’” Diede, d at 845 (d 125, 136 (Minn. 2002)).

Caselaw establishes that a dog sniff around the exterior of a “legitimately stopped” vehicle “is not a search requiring probable cause.” d 125, 133 (Minn. 2002).

An officer can expa nd the scope of a stop to include investigation of additiona l criminal activity “only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of su ch other illegal activity.” State v. Wiegand

“[T]he scope of a [seizure] must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible.” d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002).

8 “[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of th e stop.” State v. Wiegand

Incremental expansion of the stop An officer may expand the scope of the initial stop to investigate other suspected illegal activity “only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.”

5 A dog sniff around a stopped motor vehicle is a constitutionally cognizable “intrusion into privacy interests.” 4 (Minn. 2002).

(stating that whether 6 a dog sniff was a search presented a constitutional question, which was subject to de novo review).

(quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 18, 88 S. Ct. at 1878 (“[A] search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolera ble intensity and scope.”).

2 “[T]he scope of a [seizure] must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible.”

if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.” State v. Wiegand

See, (concluding use of narcotics-detection dog to sniff exterior of motor vehicle during traffic stop for routine equipment violation required “reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity”); Ascher v. *464 Comm’r of Pub.

d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002).

d 125, 137 (Minn. 2002).

As we said in State v. Wiegand, in which we declined to depart from federal precedent, the Supreme Court’s analysis “reflects a weighing of the government’s interest and the degree of intrusion on the individual that is consonant'' with this court’s approach to search and seizure analysis under the state constitution.” -33 (Minn. 2002).

A Terry stop is limited “to that which occasioned the stop, to the limited search for weapons, and to the investigation of only those additional offenses for which the officer develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion within the time necessary to resolve the originally-suspected offense.” Diede, d at 845 ().

The scope of a traffic stop “must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible.” 3 (Minn. 2002).

(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 88 S. Ct. at 1868).

“A limited investigative stop is lawful if there is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.”

“Law 8 enforcement may continue the detention as long as the reasonable suspicion for the detention remains provided they act diligently and reasonably.” (quotation omitted).

6 stating that the suspicion of criminal activity “was not dissipated by [K.C.’s] explanation that she owned the [Chrysler].” Indeed, the scope and duration of a stop may be expanded if an officer develops reasonable, articulable suspicion of other criminal activity “within the time necessary to resolve the originally-suspected offense.” -36 (Minn. 2002).

against the importance of the governmental interests at stake.”

other illegal activity.”

only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.”