Cited by

(stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion when another district c ourt, in the proper exercise of its discretion, may have reached a different result on the same facts).

“A defendant is deprived of constitutional due process of law if he is convicted on the basis of an involuntary confession.” State v. Blom

See State v. Blom , (recognizing that Minn. R. Evid.

d 578, 622–23 (Minn. 2004) (holding that improperly excluded evidence could not cause a reasonable jury to find a different verdict because of strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt).

Accepting respondent’s argument here as true would require both that we , 1) not construe the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, as we are required to do, Radke, 821 d at 328; and 2) make a finding of what the jury would have found credible, which we are not permitted to do

However, our review of factual matte rs is limited to whet her there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court’s findings.” (quotation and citations omitted ).

However, our review of factual matters is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court’s findings.” (quotation and citation omitted).

“A defendant is deprived of constitutional due process of law if he is convicted on the basis of an involuntary confession.”

See State v. Mosley , n.2 (Minn. 2014); d 578, 614 (Minn. 2004).

“Pry” means to “raise, move or force open with a lever,” or “to obtain with effort or difficulty.” The American Heritage Dictionary 1413 (4th ed. 2006 ).

(applying harmless- 5 error review to Confrontation Clause errors) (citation omitted); d 578, 621 (Minn. 2004) (applying harmless-erro r review to an “err oneous exclusion of evidence that violates the defe ndant’s right to present eviden ce”).

A district court’s cons ideration of relevance and materiality should include “the reasons and need for th e evidence, and whether there is a time, place, or modus operandi nexus.”

See generally S (concluding that a district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence that “another district court, in the proper exercise of its discretion, may have excluded”).

d 578, 612 (Minn. 2004).

(“As a general matter, courts are vested with discretion in managing trials.”).

(“[C]ourts are vested with discretion in managing trials.”); 14 (providing discretion to district courts in selecting jury instructions).

This connection must be established beyond a “bare suspicion.”

“Spreigl evidence may be relevant and material to show the identity of the perpetrator if identity is at issue and if there is a sufficient ‘time, place, or modus operandi nexus’ between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense.” ().

“A harmless error analysis applies to the erroneous exclusion of evidence that violates the defendant’s right to present evidence.”

(noting that defendant’s conviction was clear and convincing evidence of prior incident).

d 578, 621 (Minn. 2004).