Cited by

Thus, “[i]f the verdict actually rendered was surely unattributable to the error, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotation omitted).

(concluding “that the district court inappropriately made a credibility assessment in rejecting .

“Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege, and its validity depends … upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Trifiletti, d at 94 (explaining that confrontation rights can be waived).

“If the defendant’s right to self-representation is violated, he is entitled to a reversal and new trial.”

–09 (Minn. 2004) (describing the voir dire and juror selection process).

611(a) (authorizing district courts “reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence”); (“As a general matter, courts are vested with discretion in managing trials.”).

The relevant inquiry in this case is whether a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized.” (citation modified).

Appellate courts “review a district court’s decision on whether to admit [other-acts] evidence for an abuse of discretion.”

- 47 (Minn. 2007); Kennedy, d at 391; State v. Blom , -12 (Minn. 2004).

d 910, 918 (Minn. 2006) (13 years); (about 16 years).

“It is the jury’s role to assess the credibility of the evidence and the state may present rebuttal evidence for the jury to consider in making its decision.”

(stating that “courts are vested with discretion in managing trials”); Thomas, d at 618 (referencing the “broad discretion” rule 26.03, subdivision 12(g), accords a district court to reopen a party’s case).

Once the district court receives a defendant’s request to represent himself, it “must determine (1) whether the request is clear, unequivocal, and timely, and (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel.” State v. Blom , (quoting Richards, d at 263).

See Raleigh, d at 96; see also, (explaining that validity of waivers, even of constitutional rights, depends “upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case” and may be implied by defendant’s conduct) (quotation omitted).

(noting implicit credibility determinations by the district court based on the district court’s findings).

(“While we acknowledge that another district court, in the proper exercise of its discretion, may have excluded this .

“Rule 410 safeguards the confidentiality of plea negotiations in order to foster meaningful dialogue between the parties and to promote the disposition of criminal cases by compromise.”

Evidence of other bad acts or Spreigl evidence “cannot be used to show a defendant’s character for committing those [bad acts], but can be used to show motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, or a common scheme or plan.” see also Minn. R. Evid.

(concluding that postconviction credibility findings were implicit in district 12 court’s determination that appellant did not show prejudice to support ineffective-assistance claim).

d 578, 613 (Minn. 2004).

See State v. Blom , (considering Blom’s motions to change venue, continue trial, and sequester jury “together because they are factually interrelated” and have same standard of review).

(affirming admission of Spreigl evidence that occurred 16 years before offense but noting that duration of time was “troubling”); Wermerskirchen, d at 242 n.3 (affirming admission of Spreigl evidence that occurred 19 years before offense).

While a defendant has a right to self -representation, State v. Richards , that right is not absolute, State v. Blom

Bothun later moved 3 “Modus operandi” in this context is not to be confused with that term’s use in cases involving so-called “‘signature’ crime[s].”

the less likely the evidence will be used improperly by the jury.”

“When a criminal defendant asks to represent himself, the court must determine (1) whether the request is clear, unequivocal, and timely, and (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel.” (emphasis added) (quoting Richards, d at 263).

(stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion when another district c ourt, in the proper exercise of its discretion, may have reached a different result on the same facts).

“A defendant is deprived of constitutional due process of law if he is convicted on the basis of an involuntary confession.” State v. Blom

See State v. Blom , (recognizing that Minn. R. Evid.

d 578, 622–23 (Minn. 2004) (holding that improperly excluded evidence could not cause a reasonable jury to find a different verdict because of strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt).