Cited by

Accordingly, Scheffler ultimately must present clear and convincing evidence that any defamatory statements were “made with the knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless disregard of whether [they were] false or not.” Maethner, d at 873 (quotations omitted); (stating a plaintiff must establish “a prima facie claim of defamation by clear and convincing evidence”).

“[W]hether the evidence in the record is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence is a question of law which [an appellate] court reviews de novo.”

21 We contrast this with the situation in Chafoulias v. Peterson, where the supreme court addressed whether a limited purpose public figure inserted himself into a “public controversy.” -53 (Minn. 2003).

(concluding a “mere failure to investigate” does not establish malice in the context of actual malice and public figures); (concluding a company’s “failure to investigate” before firing an employee for theft does not “ris[e] t

710 ; *822 Chafoulias v. Peterson , , 648-49 (Minn. 2003).

" Chafoulias v. Peterson , , 655 (Minn. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting St.

This protection for statements concerning “limited- purpose public figures” is justified in part because such persons are thought to have “greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements [ than] private individuals.” (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344, 94 S. Ct. at 3009).

“[R]eckless disregard” means that the defendant made the statement “while subjectively believing that the statement is probably false.” (quotation omitted).

“[R]eckless disregard requires that a defendant make a statement while subjectively believing that the statement is probably false.” (quotation omitted).

(affirming summary judgment where the record did not contain “clear and convincing evidence” of actual malice); Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., (affirming summary judgment determination that securities offerings were integrated and not exempt from registration require

710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (defining “actual malice” as acting “with knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”); (same); Fitzgerald v. Minn. Chiropractic Ass’n, Inc., (defining “actual malice” as “either actual knowledge of the falsity of the publication or reckless disregard of whether it is false or not”).

Because the plain language of section 21 IB.06 -55 (Minn.2003), that definition applies to a complaint filed in the OAH alleging a violation of section 21 IB.06.

(noting that in cases involving the existence of probable cause for a search and seizure, we have stated that “the determination of probable cause is a question of law for the court and that an appellate court makes an independent review of the record to determine probable cause * * * where the histor

-55 (Minn.2003) (citations and quotations omitted).

-55 (Minn.2003) (citations and quotations omitted).