Cited by

(stating that if an item is found “in a place to which others had access” the state must prove “that there is a strong probability, inferable from the evidence, that the defendant was, at the time, consciously exercising dominion and control over it”) .

(concluding that “the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that [appellant] constructively possessed [a] firearm” based on the facts that appellant lived in an apartment where the firearm was found and the firearm was discovered near appellant’s personal belongings).

See, d 145, 150- 51 (Minn. 2009) (explaining joint constructive possession); (stating that possession charges encompass theories of independent and joint possession); (stating that circumstantial evidence may prove constructive possession).

But “[i]f a defendant’s trial objection [to a jury instruction] embodies the arguments raised on appeal, the claim has been properly preserved, even if the defendant did not clearly articulate his objection to the instruction at trial.”

at 835-36; (holding there was sufficient evidence that defendant constructively possessed a firearm when the firearm was found in an apartment defendant admitted to living in, the state introduced utility bills and other mailings in defendant’s name that were delivered to the apartment, and defendant ke

consciously exercising dominion and control over [the item].” -43 (Minn. App. 2014) (holding that dominion and control is required over the item, not the place where the item is found).

(finding a firearm in the defendant’s apartment); d 805, 813 (Minn. App. 2000) (finding d rugs in the defendant’ s bedroom), review denied (Minn. Jan.

We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that “the [fact-finder] bel ieved the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Porter

The statute does not define “possess,” but under caselaw, “the state must establish either actual or constructive possession.” .

See State v. Porter , (noting that the stat e bears the burden of proving constructive possession, and an instruction on constructive possession is necessary when a firearm is found in an apartment defend ant shared with other people ).

State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 104, (stating that constructive -possession standards apply to both controlled substances and firearms).

any other firearm.” The statute doe s not define “possess,” but under the case law , “the state must establish either actual or constructive possession.” State v. Porter

e noted that it was “not a strong objection.” And when the district court asked if Owens objected to the substance of the proposed instructions regarding the definition and elements of the offense, Owens responded “No.” “[A] defendant who has objected to the substance of a jury instruction at trial has preserved his right to seek a review of the instruction on appeal.”

d 1 We apply the heightened circumstantial-evidence standard of review because this case involves constructive possession of items found in a shared space, requiring the conscious exercise of dominion and control.

“To obtain a conviction under [section 624.713], the state must establish either actual or constructive possession of a firearm.”

ugs in the defendant’s home); (finding drugs in bedroom of defendant’s home); State v. Carr, 311 Minn. 161, 163, (finding drugs in the defendant’s home); State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 422, -76 (1973) (finding drugs in the place where the defendant either lived or spent a lot of time); (finding drugs in the defendant’s apartment); (finding drugs in the defendant’s bedroom), review denied (Minn. Jan.

(citing State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 105 , ).

And once you strip the notion of sole, sovereign, supreme authority from the historic definition of “dominion,” all that remains is “control.” One case that comes close to ascribing a distinction between “dominion” and “control”