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We have held that “when crimes are committed against different persons in the same incident, the district court has discretion to impose one sentence per victim so long as such sentencing does not exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” (holding that the decision to impose three consecutive life sentences for first degree murder was within the discretion of the district court under Minn. Stat. § 609.15 and subject to appellate review only to ensure consecutive sentences were “com

(reasoning that a jury may infer intent from the circumstances of a particular crime by drawing on “sensory perceptions, life experiences, and common sense”).

We have previously held that “[w]here a defendant is granted leave to renew his motion for change of venue immediately before trial, but declines to do so, he waives ‘any right he may have had to a change of venue.’ ” ().

According to McInnis, every other juvenile who has been given consecutive sentences on murder convictions ha s “intentionally directed [the criminal act ] towards more than one person .” He cites State v. Ali , , and State v. Brom , .

7, 512 (Minn. 2009) (stating that “we have upheld similar 4 sentences” and then concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing multiple sentences); (“Whether consecutive sentencing over exaggerates criminality is determined by this court, based on our observations of sentences in similar cases.”); State v. Brom , (affirming multiple consecutive life sentences for multiple counts of premeditated murder, based on precedent ).

The issue of mental illness is one for the factfinder to resolve, State v. Brom , and a reviewing court therefore giv es “broad deference” to the fact finder’s determination as to the appropriate weight assigned to various testimony , -23 (Minn. 2009).

pecially those involving “particularly callous murders”); 186 (Minn. 1994) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing two life sentences for a juvenile offender’s two first-degree murder convictions and two 180-month sentences for his two attempted first-degree murder convictions, all sentences served consecutively); (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing a juvenile defendant to three consecutive life sentences and one concurren

a criminal defendant who raised the defense of mental illness at trial challenges his conviction, this court conducts a rigorous review of the record to determine whether the evidence, direct and 3 circumstantial, viewed most favorably to support a finding of guilt, was sufficient to permit the fact finder to reach its conclusion.” (quotation omitted).

that a district court abused its discretion in imposing concurrent sentences on a defendant who shot and killed three victims); (affirming consecutive sentences for a 15-year-old who shot and killed two people at close range); (affirming consecutive life sentences for a 16-year-old who murdered his parents and siblings with an ax).

E.g., Peterson, d at 822 ; Provost, d at 104 ; -64 (Minn.1990)

See, (affirming two consecutive life sentences for the murder of two students); (holding that trial court abused its discretion in imposing concurrent sentences, as opposed to consecutive sentences, upon defendant who shot and killed three victims at close range); (holding that three consecutive life sentences were commensurate of defendant’s murdering of four family members); (affirming two consecutive life sentences for a double homicide).

-63 (Minn.1990); Bouwman, 328 *d at 704-05.

(upholding consecutive sentences for 15-year-old who shot four victims at close range when none offered any resistance); (upholding consecutive sentences for 16-year-old who killed four family members with an ax).

This court has “held that the issue of legal mental illness is a question for the finder of fact to resolve.”

See, -64 (Minn.1990) (holding that psychiatric testimony on issues of intent and premeditation in murder trial *887 properly excluded); (holding expert testimony on unreliability of eyewitness identification in robbery trial properly excluded); State v. Yates, 392

763 n. 9 (Minn.1990) (explaining that “the behavioral manifestations of mental impairment,” as opposed to experience with the “technical jargon of psychiatry,” is “capable of lay understanding”).

Appellant argues, however, that his jail credit must be applied to each of his eon- *849 secutive sentences, -66 (Minn.1990).

cert, denied, 499 U.S. 940 , 111 S.Ct.

“Where a defendant is granted leave- to renew his motion for change of venue immediately before trial, but declines to do so, he waives ‘any right he may have had to a change of venue.’ ” ().