Cited by

See, –39 (Minn. 2001); State v. Johannessohn, 2024 WL 3250423, at *5 (Minn. App. July 1, 2024); (declining to decide whether a specific-unanimity instruction “would be warranted when the separate acts constitute a continuing course of conduct”).

The first Minnesota case to squarely address the question of whether a

State v. Stempf , d 352, 355 (Minn. App. 2001).

d 352, 355 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 824 (1999)).

(concluding that a specific-unanimity instruction was necessary, in part, because the state told the jury during closing arguments that either of two alleged acts of drug possession could satisfy the possession element of the charged crime).

“[T]he jury must unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime.”

7 First, a verdict remains unanimous even if all members of the jury do not agree on “alternative means or ways in which the crime can be committed.” -55 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted).

4 “A unanimous verdict shall be required in all cases.” State v. Stempf , (quotation omitted).

State v. Stempf , d 352, 355 (Minn. App. 2001) .

“[T]he jury must unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime,” but the jury need not agree on “alternative means or ways in which the crime can be committed.” -55 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted).

And when “jury instructions allow for possible significant disagreement among jurors as to what acts the defendant committed, the instructions violate the defendant’s right to a unanim ous verdict.” -55 (Minn. App. 2001).

“[T]he jury must unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime,” but the jury is not required to agree on “alternative means or ways in which the crime can be committed.” -55 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted).

A jury, therefore, must unanimously agree on which acts a defendant committed if different acts could satisfy a single element, but unanimity is not required as to the “alternative means or ways in which the crime can be committed.” -55 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted).

While it is true, as Abdeltawwab points out, that all elements of an offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, “unanimity is not required with respect to the alternative means or ways in which the crime can be committed.” -55 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted).

This court has previously held this to mean that “the jury must 4 unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime.” -55 (Minn. App. 2001).

(reviewing whether jury instruction violated defendant’s right to unanimous verdict).

“Whe[n] jury instructions allow for possible significant disagreement among jurors as to what acts the defendant committed, 8 the instructions violate the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict.”

d 352, 355 (Minn. App. 2001).

In State v. Stempf, we noted that “[u]nderlying facts about which the jury would not necessarily have to agree would be whether the defendant had actual or constructive possession.”

(noting that “certain statutory alternatives are mere means of committing a single offense, rather than independent elements of the crime” (quotation omitted)).

If the state offers more than one act by a defendant to prove one element of the charged crime, “the jury must unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed.” (citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 824 (1999) (holding that “series of violations” in the criminal-enterprise statute required the jury unanimously to agree that the defendant committed a continuing series of violations and unanimously to agree on which three acts constitut

W hile “the jury must unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime,” it is not required to unanimously agree on “alternative means or ways in which the crime can be committed.” -55 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted) .

Appellant likens his case to State v. Stempf , , but that case is distinguishable.

But, while “the jury must unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime,” the jury is not required to unanimously agree on “alternative means or ways in wh ich the crime can be committed.” State v. Stempf , -55 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted).

“[T]he jury must unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime.” (citing Richardson v. United States , 526 U.S. 813, 824, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 1713 (1999)).

-56 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted).

Ojohn relies primarily on this court’s

But, while “the jury must unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime,” the jury is not required to unanimously agree on “alternative means or ways in which the crime can be committed.” State v. Stempf , -55 (Mi nn.

Adams cites State v. Stempf for the pro position that “the jury must unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed if each act itself constitutes an element of the crime.” , 355 (Minn. App. 2001) .

See State v. Stempf , 5-56 (Minn. App. 2001) ; State v. Ihle , 6 , 918 (Minn. 2002 ).

–57 (Minn. App. 2011) (distinguishing Stempf and 6 not requiring unanimity instruction in assault trial where the two alleged actions were part of the same behavioral incident rather than two independent acts constituting separate crimes

Strickland v. 11 because the state relied on either of two acts as bases for conviction on a single count.

But when “jury instructions allow for possible significant disagreement among jurors as to what acts the defendant committed, the instructions violate the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict.” see also Richardson v. United States , 526 U.S. 813, 824, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 1713 (1999) (holding that the jury must unanimously agree as to which acts the defendant committed if each act alone constitutes an element of the crime ).

To support his claim, appellant relies on State v. Stempf

his workplace; and (2) that he possessed methamphetamine found in the truck in which he was riding when he arrived at work.”

“Whe[n] jury instructions allow for possible significant disagreement among jurors as to what acts the defendant committed, the instructions violate the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict.”