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While convictions for domestic assault or terroristic threats do not inherently demonstrate a willingness to lie, “a crime need not relate directly to truth or falsity to be admissible.”

(considering “appellant’s prior criminal record” in its probable-cause analysis); (concluding that “the trial court properly considered [Lieberg’s criminal history] as one factor in the totality of relevant circumstances”).

And this court has observed that “a crime need not relate directly to truth or falsity to be admissible.”

(recognizing that the district court is in a “unique position” to assess and weigh the Jones factors and “must be accorded broad discretion”), rev. granted (Minn. Apr.

See State v. Hochstein , ; Lieberg, d at 56 .

See Siegfried, d at 115-16 (noting that the issuing judge was perm itted to rely on tips from othe r informants in determining whether the primary informan t was telling the truth); s ee also State v. Hochstein , (indicating that an informant’s tip corroborated, and was corroborated by, the statements of two other informants).

information of drug sales); (concluding that probable cause was not stale even after passage of several months when items sought were of “enduring utility to their taker ”); King, d at 40 1–02 (concluding that probable cause was not stale because of seven-day delay between issuance of search warrant and execution); State v. Hochstein , (concluding that probable cause was not stale because of three-day delay between provision of information by informant and issuance of search warrant); (concludin

Because the district co urt is in “a unique position” to assess and weigh the Jones factors, “it must be accorded broad discretion.”

As the district court is in “a unique position” to assess and weigh the Jones factors, “it must be accorded broad discretion.” State v. Hochstein

Because the district court is in “a unique position” to assess and weigh the Jones factors, “it must be accorded broad discretion.”

But because the district court is in “a unique position” to assess and weigh the Jones factors, “it must be accorded broad discretion.” State v. Hochstein

(upholding issuance of search warrant when the statement of one informant was corroborated by the similar statements of two other informants).

-25 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that this factor weighed against admission when prior crime was nearly identical to charged crime but affirming admission based on other factors).

(concluding that probable cause to search existed based in part on the appellant’s three arrests for drug-related offenses and conviction of a fourth-degree controlled-substance crime); -57 (Minn. App. 1996) (determining that the defendant’s entire

(rejecting staleness argument because, inter alia, “certain information provided by the third informant was only three days old when the court signed the warrant”); see also U.S. v. Palega, 556 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that “[w]hile some of the information provided in the war

“When an activity is of an ongoing, protracted nature, the passage of time is less significant.” (quotation omitted).

-25 (Minn.App.2001) (affirming admission of prior conviction when first Jones factor was neutral, second and third factors weighed against admission, and fourth and *744 fifth factors weighed in favor of admission).

Probable cause exists when there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (quotation omitted).