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The state counters that the prosecuting attorney “did not have to prove when each offense occurred because that is not an element of the crime.” The precise date of an offense “is an essential element of the crime only where the act done is unlawful during certain seasons, on certain days or at certain hours of the day.”

“The complaint must state the essential facts 11 constituting the offense charged.” State v. Becker

“[V]agueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts at hand.” (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975)).

Precise offense dates are only essential elements when “the act done is unlawful during certain seasons, on certain days or at certain hours of the day.”

(stating that the precise date is an essential element of the crime only “where 2 We recently raised this issue in a nonprecedential case.

State v. Becker , (holding that a defendant can be convicted of sexual abuse if the prosecution proves abuse occurred within a reasonable period; specific dates of abuse need not be proved); (“[S]pecific dates need not be charged or proven in a sexual abuse cas

(determining, as part of a rule 17.05 analysis, th at aiding and abetting instruction did not alter the substantive offense); (“[T]he rule has evolved that in the prosecution of crimes in which a particular day is not a material ingredient of the offense, the indictment or complaint need not allege the particular date on which the offense was committed, only that it occurred before the 3 We acknowledge that in reviewi

“The complaint must state the essential facts constitutin g the offense charged.”

But the state may amend the offense date if it is not a mat erial element of the offense , and it is an essential element only when the offense is prohibited “during certain seasons, on certain days or at certain hours.”

23, 2008); (stating that the statute did not “make a particular time period a material element of th e offense”); (“[S]pecific dates need not be charged or proven in a sexual abuse case.”).

“It is well-settled that vagueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts at hand.” (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92, 96 S. Ct. 316, 319 (1975)); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside , Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (1982) (“A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vague

(quoting State v. Becker , ).

First and foremost, “[i]t is well-settled that vagueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts at hand.”

See, e.g. , State v. Becker , (concluding that defendant may be convicted of sexual abuse if prosecution proves that abuse occurred within reasonable period of time, and specific dates of abuse need not be proven); (“[S]pecific dates need not be charged or proven in a

(holding that a defendant may be convicted of sexual abuse if the prosecution proves that the abuse occurred within a reasonable period of time, and specific dates of abuse need not be proven)

Vague laws can violate due process in at least two ways: they “trap the innocent by not providing adequate warning of unlawful conduct” and they “unleash the potential for unfair and uneven law enforcement by not establishing minimal guidelines.”

“[Vlagueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts at hand.” (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct.

at 86 , d at 614 ; (“It is well-settled that vagueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts at hand.”).

See State v. *548 Becker, (holding that a defendant can be convicted of sexual abuse if the prosecution proves abuse occurred within a reasonable period of time; specific dates of abuse need not be proven); (providing “specific dates need not be charged or proven in a sexual

This “nature and cause” requirement is satisfied if an indictment “contains such descriptions of the offense charged as will enable [a defendant] to make his defense and to plead the judgment in bar of any further prosecution for the same crime.” (quoting Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 34 , 16 S.Ct.

This “nature and cause” requirement is satisfied if the charging instrument “ ‘contains such descriptions of the offense charged as will enable him to make his defense and to plead the judgment in bar of any further prosecution for the same *30 crime.’ ” (quoting Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 34 , 16 S.Ct.

(noting particular time not an element of offense), review denied (Minn. May 1, 1985); (allowing the state to charge multiple acts of sexual abuse over an unspecified period of time where defendant availed herself of discovery opportunities).

If a vagueness challenge does not involve a First Amendment freedom, then it must be “examined in light of the facts at hand.”

1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)

1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)

316, 319 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975)

A vague law traps the innocent because it does not provide “adequate warning of unlawful conduct and [unleashes] the potential for unfair and uneven law enforcement by not establishing minimal guidelines.” (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 92 S.Ct.