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Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Bliss v. Stevens, 551 N.W.2d 919.

103 citing documents.

  • A17-0564 Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    It cannot be based on a “hunch” or be “the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” Id.; -22 (Minn. 1996) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
  • Joshua Alvin Peterson, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    -22 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted).
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    The stop must be “based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken togeth er with rational inferences from those facts, reaso nably warrant that intrusion.’” –22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).
  • State of Minnesota v. Gary Wayne Wright Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    A limited investigatory stop is an exception to the warrant requirement if the state can demonstrate that the police officer had specific and articulable facts that created a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)).
  • State of Minnesota v. Jose Martin Lugo, Jr. 887 N.W.2d 476 Minn. 2016
    For example, quoting Webber , we framed the issue as “whether the district court was ‘clearly and unequivocally’ erroneous” in suppressing evidence.
  • State of Minnesota v. Creighton Thomas Penn Minn. Ct. App. 2016
    4 based upon “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” -22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).
  • State of Minnesota v. Steven Duane Smith Minn. Ct. App. 2016
    -22 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted).
  • State of Minnesota v. Michael Jerald Mattison Minn. Ct. App. 2016
    To meet this standard, an officer must “show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity” but rather “was based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” -22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).
  • Carole Jean Halverson v. State of Minnesota, and State of Minnesota v. Carole Jean Halverson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
  • Distinguished State of Minnesota v. Robert Carl Thoensen Minn. Ct. App. 2016
    (upholding stop where police officer observed a vehicle whose registered owner’s driving privileges were revoked); (upholding stop where police officer observed a vehicle with current-year license plate tabs, but a records check showed the vehic
  • State of Minnesota v. Marco Allen Coney Minn. Ct. App. 2016
    “The police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon ‛specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” -22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).
  • State of Minnesota v. James Lamar Davis Minn. Ct. App. 2016
    “The police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” -22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).
  • Nicholas James Heinz v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
    “The police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” –22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).
  • State of Minnesota v. Jesse Andrew Faust Minn. Ct. App. 2016
    “The police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” -22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).
  • State of Minnesota v. Joseph Scott Welch Minn. Ct. App. 2016
  • Troy K. Scheffler v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2015
  • State of Minnesota v. Joseph John West, IV Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    “A brief investigatory stop requires 6 only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, rather than probable cause.”
  • Lester Leroy Hiltz, Jr. v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2015
  • James Fletcher Cameron v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    (holding that an actual traffic violation is not necessary to justify a stop); (“[I]nnocent activity might justify the suspicion of criminal activity.”).
  • State of Minnesota v. Troy Kenneth Scheffler Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    “When an officer observes a vehicle being driven, it is rational for him or her to infer that the owner of the vehicle is the current operator.”
  • State of Minnesota v. Sharleen Leslie Paulson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    To meet the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard, an officer must “show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity” but rather “was based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” -22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).
  • State of Minnesota v. George Kimuhu Gatungu Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    An officer’s suspicion is reasonable when it is based on specific, articulable facts, -43 (Minn. 2011), and is not the product of “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity,”
  • Neil Douglas Rollins v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    State v. Pike, 3 -22 (Minn. 1996).
  • Daniel Roy Gibbs v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    To meet the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard, an officer must “show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity” but rather “was based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” -22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).
  • State of Minnesota v. Damian Mata Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    An objective basis exists so long as “the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.”
  • State v. Setinich 822 N.W.2d 9 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
    A police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop, which “requires only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, rather than probable cause.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 88 S.Ct.
  • State v. Cox 807 N.W.2d 447 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
  • State v. Yang 774 N.W.2d 539 Minn. 2009
    An investigatory stop of a vehicle is justified if police have a “ ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct.
  • Lewis v. Commissioner of Public Safety 737 N.W.2d 591 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
  • State v. Vonderharr 733 N.W.2d 847 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
    But “[a] brief investigatory stop requires only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, rather than probable cause.”
  • State v. Johnson 713 N.W.2d 64 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
    In order to justify such an investigatory stop, “[t]he police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon ‘specific and articula-ble facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” -22 (Minn.1996) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct.
  • State v. Davis 711 N.W.2d 841 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
  • State v. Mahr 701 N.W.2d 286 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
  • State v. Johnson 689 N.W.2d 247 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
    (holding that “[w]hen an officer observes a vehicle being driven, it is rational for him or her to infer that the owner of the vehicle is the current operator”).
  • State v. Anderson 683 N.W.2d 818 Minn. 2004
    In order to justify such an investigatory stop, “the police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon ‘specific and articula-ble facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” -22 (Minn.1996) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct.
  • State v. Bergerson 659 N.W.2d 791 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
    The police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” , 921-22 (Minn.1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 , 88 S.Ct.
  • State v. Waddell 655 N.W.2d 803 Minn. 2003
    Reasonable, articulable suspicion requires a showing that the stop was “not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.”
  • State v. Larsen 650 N.W.2d 144 Minn. 2002
    See, (holding fact that vehicle had broken window was insufficient to support trial court conclusion that officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying investigative stop); (finding officer's stop of vehicle thought to be driven by owner with revoked license was not unconstitutional because officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); (finding stop of vehicle warranted where officer reasonably suspected drive
  • State v. Wiegand 645 N.W.2d 125 Minn. 2002
    While the officer need not have probable cause, the officer may not be motivated by “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” -22 (Minn.1996).
  • State v. Vereb 643 N.W.2d 342 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
    (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 88 S.Ct.
  • State v. Dalos 635 N.W.2d 94 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
    Instead, it must be based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational *96 inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” -22 (Minn.1996) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct.
  • State v. Lopez 631 N.W.2d 810 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
    “A brief investigatory stop requires only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, rather than probable cause.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 88 S.Ct.
  • Gerding v. Commissioner of Public Safety 628 N.W.2d 197 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
    Under the Fourth Amendment, police officers may, however, make limited, warrantless investigative stops of vehicles when there is a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” -22 (Minn.1996).
  • State v. Richardson 622 N.W.2d 823 Minn. 2001
    Such a stop is lawful “if the state can show the officer to have had a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct.
  • State v. Baumann 616 N.W.2d 771 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
    upheld as constitutional the stop of a suspect’s vehicle based on a routine computer check of the suspect’s license plates, which indicated that the vehicle’s registered owner’s license had been revoked.
  • State v. Demry 605 N.W.2d 106 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
    2408, 2412 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)
  • State v. Britton 604 N.W.2d 84 Minn. 2000
  • State v. Munson 594 N.W.2d 128 Minn. 1999
    2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)