Cited by

Amendment[]”); -64 (Minn. 2003) (discussing “standing” and “legitimate expectation of privacy” in context of motion to suppress evidence seized as the result of search of a home).

State v. Heden , –98 (Minn. 2006) (affirming a conviction for felony murder where the defendant tried to quiet a baby with a bottle, a pacifier and “digital penetration” (criminal sexual conduct) before losing his temper and shaking her to death); –66 (Minn. 2003) (holding that the state proved felony murder because the beating that caused death and the acts of criminal sexual conduct occurred as part of the defendant’s broader plan to torture the victim).

“[H]owever, we afford great deference to the court’s finding of probable cause and limit our review to ensuring that the court had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.”

See, e.g., State v. McBride , –66 (Minn. 2003) (holding evidence sufficient because examining physician “testified that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, McBride was the source of the bite marks at the base of Dillon’s penis, on the left side of Dillon’s scrotum, and on Dillon’s tongue”); d 430, 437–39

‘While we may interpret the Minnesota Constitution to provide more protection than the [United States] Constitution, it may not afford less.”

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 14 8-49, 99 S. Ct. at 43 3; -21 (Minn. 2017) (concluding that a guest, who is subject to an arrest warrant, cannot as sert the homeowner’s right to privacy); (legitimate expectation of privacy exists in a shared apartment); B.R.K., d at 576 (holding that a short-term social guest has a privacy expectation in the host’s home because the host consented to the guest’s presence and shared his privacy interest with the guest).

(“While [an appellate court] may interpret the Minnesota Constitution to provide more protection than the U.S. Constitution, it may not afford less.”).

(upholding denial of appellant’s motion to suppress notebook seized pursuant to a search warrant explicitly seeking books and first aid manuals).

When a defendant alleges that a search violated his constitutional rights, we determine whether the search “has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

see also Raleas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 , 99 S.Ct.

We have held that in order to prove that a defendant caused the death of a human being while committing criminal sexual conduct, “the state must prove that ‘the “fatal wound” was inflicted during the same “chain of events” [in which the underlying felony took place] so that the requisite time, distance, and causal relationship between the felony and killing are established.’ ” (alterations in original) ().

When we examine “whether a defendant can bring a claim asserting a violation of his or her Fourth Amendment rights, the issue is ‘whether the disputed search * * * has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.’ ” ( (Carter I), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 83 , 119 S.Ct.

See, (court reviewing another magistrate’s issuance of search warrant ensures “that the court had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed”).

I. In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we are “limited to ascertaining whether, based on the evidence presented at trial, a jury could have reasonably concluded that the accused is guilty of the offense.”