Cited by

an those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment” and “creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance” (quotation omitted)); (holding that prolonged description of prior -crimes evidence was prejudicial because it improperly “inflame[d] the jury”); (noting that preventing a “conviction based on prejudice created by evidence of other crimes is th e underlying purpose” for excluding such evidence).

-05 (Minn. 1991) (explaining that the need to 10 Prejudice to D.L.N.’s Case Although the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Spreigl evidence, we nevertheless address D.L.N.’s argument that his case was prejudiced by the erroneous admission of evidence.

(recommending that district courts hold evidentiary hearings in close cases but recognizing that “A full hearing may not always be feasible or necessary and the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether or not to require a hearing.”).

Garcia further argues that, “[a]t the very least, without [N.B.’s] identification, the admission of the Spreigl evidence becomes a close call, which requires that the evidence be excluded.” But the state can meet the clear-and-convincing-evidence standa rd with circumstantial evidence, and the circumst antial evidence connecting Garcia to the West St.

To meet the clear-and-convincing standard, the state must show that the evidence makes the thing to be proved “highly probable,” (quotation omitted), and it may do so with either direct or circumstantial evidence, –04 (Minn. 1991).

To meet the clear-and-convincing standard, the state must show that the evidence makes the thing to be proved “highly probable,” (quotation omitted), and it may do so with either direct or circumstantial evidence, – 04 (Minn. 1991).

“Admission of Spreigl evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” .

(recognizing concern for unfair prejudice 1 Cooper contends that the district court should have reserved its Spreigl ruling until after the close of the state’s case.

(stating that “the potential for prejudicial impact from the Spreigl evidence [is] arguably lessened by the [district] court’s .

(stating that “the potentia l for prejudicial impact from the Spreigl evidence [is] arguably lessened by the trial court’s .

see State v. DeWald , (“Admission of Spreigl evidence rests within the sound discretion of the [district] court.

(“Admission of Spreigl evidence rests within the sound discretion of the [district] court .

404(b) to protect against “the risk of unfair prejudice.”

404(b); -03 (Minn. 1991).

State v. Richmond, 298 Minn. 561, 563, (stating that preventing “a conviction based on prejudice created by evidence of other crimes is the underlying purpose” for excluding other-crimes evidence).

“At that juncture, the [district] court can fully assess whether or not the Spreigl evidence is crucial to the state’s burden of proof.”

t a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged — or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment — creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance” (quotation omitted)); Townsend, d at 296 (holding prolonged description of prior-crimes evidence prejudicial because it improperly “inflame[d] the jury”); (noting that preventing a “conviction based on prejudice created by evidence of other crimes is the underlying purpose” for ex

-03 (Minn.1991); State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488

a court considering the admissibility of Spreigl evidence should make assessments as to the strength of the state’s case and the state’s need for the evidence to meet its burden of proof.

nd the murder is weak because the burglaries “oe-curr[ed] nearly a year after Fafrowicz’s murder,” and because burglary and murder while committing sexual assault are crimes that are “not even of the same generic type * * *.” Bailey also argues that the Spreigl evidence had no probative value in this case because the other identity evidence offered by the state is strong, (“This court has stated that Spreigl evidence is admissible only if the trial court finds the direct or circumstantial eviden

(); -97 (Minn.1995) (detailing procedural requirements and safeguards governing other-crimes evidence).